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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	patches@lists.linux.dev, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>
Subject: [PATCH 6.1 15/15] x86/srso: Correct the mitigation status when SMT is disabled
Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2023 16:15:11 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230824141447.863010001@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230824141447.155846739@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>

commit 6405b72e8d17bd1875a56ae52d23ec3cd51b9d66 upstream.

Specify how is SRSO mitigated when SMT is disabled. Also, correct the
SMT check for that.

Fixes: e9fbc47b818b ("x86/srso: Disable the mitigation on unaffected configurations")
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814200813.p5czl47zssuej7nv@treble
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2398,8 +2398,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigatio
 		 * Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable after the right
 		 * IBPB microcode has been applied.
 		 */
-		if ((boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19) &&
-		    (!cpu_smt_possible() || (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_DISABLED))) {
+		if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19 && !cpu_smt_possible()) {
 			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO);
 			return;
 		}
@@ -2689,7 +2688,7 @@ static ssize_t gds_show_state(char *buf)
 static ssize_t srso_show_state(char *buf)
 {
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO))
-		return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
+		return sysfs_emit(buf, "Mitigation: SMT disabled\n");
 
 	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s%s\n",
 			  srso_strings[srso_mitigation],



  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-08-24 14:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-08-24 14:14 [PATCH 6.1 00/15] 6.1.48-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:14 ` [PATCH 6.1 01/15] x86/cpu: Fix __x86_return_thunk symbol type Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:14 ` [PATCH 6.1 02/15] x86/cpu: Fix up srso_safe_ret() and __x86_return_thunk() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:14 ` [PATCH 6.1 03/15] x86/alternative: Make custom return thunk unconditional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 04/15] x86/cpu: Clean up SRSO return thunk mess Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 05/15] x86/cpu: Rename original retbleed methods Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 06/15] x86/cpu: Rename srso_(.*)_alias to srso_alias_\1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 07/15] x86/cpu: Cleanup the untrain mess Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 08/15] x86/srso: Explain the untraining sequences a bit more Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 09/15] x86/static_call: Fix __static_call_fixup() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 10/15] x86/retpoline: Dont clobber RFLAGS during srso_safe_ret() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 11/15] x86/CPU/AMD: Fix the DIV(0) initial fix attempt Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 12/15] x86/srso: Disable the mitigation on unaffected configurations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 13/15] x86/retpoline,kprobes: Fix position of thunk sections with CONFIG_LTO_CLANG Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 14/15] objtool/x86: Fixup frame-pointer vs rethunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2023-08-24 21:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 00/15] 6.1.48-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2023-08-25  3:05   ` Florian Fainelli
2023-08-25  1:30 ` SeongJae Park
2023-08-25  2:40 ` Joel Fernandes
2023-08-25  7:05 ` Naresh Kamboju
2023-08-25  7:05   ` [LTP] " Naresh Kamboju
2023-08-25  7:15   ` Harshit Mogalapalli
2023-08-25  7:15     ` [LTP] " Harshit Mogalapalli
2023-08-25  7:45   ` Christian Brauner
2023-08-25  7:45     ` [LTP] " Christian Brauner
2023-08-25  8:10   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-25  8:10     ` [LTP] " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-25  8:48     ` Naresh Kamboju
2023-08-25  8:48       ` [LTP] " Naresh Kamboju
2023-08-25 16:29       ` Harshit Mogalapalli
2023-08-25 16:29         ` [LTP] " Harshit Mogalapalli
2023-08-25  9:33     ` Naresh Kamboju
2023-08-25  9:33       ` [LTP] " Naresh Kamboju
2023-08-25  9:26 ` Sudip Mukherjee (Codethink)
2023-08-26  8:45   ` Salvatore Bonaccorso
2023-08-25  9:40 ` Naresh Kamboju
2023-08-25 10:15 ` Jon Hunter
2023-08-25 12:16 ` Conor Dooley
2023-08-25 12:33 ` Takeshi Ogasawara
2023-08-25 15:40 ` Guenter Roeck
2023-08-25 18:12 ` Shuah Khan
2023-08-26  1:23 ` Bagas Sanjaya

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