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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-serial@vger.kernel.org,
	Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] vt: Fix potential read overflow of kernel memory
Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2023 14:28:21 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202308301421.997C4034B5@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CADmuW3Wbgb7s+jRm8F0hcjzreWysVdzNvv778yUbGCOxAJHwjQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Aug 30, 2023 at 03:25:54PM -0400, Azeem Shaikh wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 30, 2023 at 1:57 PM Greg Kroah-Hartman
> <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Aug 30, 2023 at 04:04:10PM +0000, Azeem Shaikh wrote:
> > > strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first.
> > > This read may exceed the destination size limit if
> > > a source string is not NUL-terminated [1].
> >
> > But that's not the case here, right?  So your "potential read overflow"
> > isn't relevant here.
> >
> > > The copy_to_user() call uses @len returned from strlcpy() directly
> > > without checking its value. This could potentially lead to read
> > > overflow.
> >
> > But can it?  How?
> >
> 
> The case I was considering is when the null-terminated hardcoded
> string @func_table[kb_func] has length @new_len > @len. In this case,
> strlcpy() will assign @len = @new_len and copy_to_user() would read
> @new_len from the kmalloc-ed memory of @len. This is the potential
> read overflow I was referring to. Let me know if I'm mistaken.

First there is:

ssize_t len = sizeof(user_kdgkb->kb_string);

"struct user_kdgkb" is UAPI (therefore unlikely to change), and kb_string
is 512:

struct kbsentry {
        unsigned char kb_func;
        unsigned char kb_string[512];
};

Then we do:

                len = strlcpy(kbs, func_table[kb_func] ? : "", len);

This is the anti-pattern (take the length of the _source_) we need to
remove. However, func_table[] is made up of either %NUL-terminated
strings:

char func_buf[] = {
        '\033', '[', '[', 'A', 0, 
        '\033', '[', '[', 'B', 0, 
...
char *func_table[MAX_NR_FUNC] = {
        func_buf + 0,
        func_buf + 5,
...

Or a NULL address itself. The ?: operator handles the NULL case, so
"len" can only ever be 0 through the longest string in func_buf. So it's
what I'd call "accidentally correct". i.e. it's using a fragile
anti-pattern, but in this case everything is hard-coded and less than
512.

Regardless, we need to swap for a sane pattern, which you've done. But
the commit log is misleading, so it needs some more detail. :)

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2023-08-30 21:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-08-30 16:04 [PATCH] vt: Fix potential read overflow of kernel memory Azeem Shaikh
2023-08-30 17:57 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-30 19:25   ` Azeem Shaikh
2023-08-30 21:28     ` Kees Cook [this message]
2023-08-30 23:17       ` Dan Raymond
2023-08-30 23:48         ` Kees Cook
2023-08-31  5:45           ` Dan Raymond
2023-08-31 14:23             ` Azeem Shaikh
2023-09-15  2:56               ` Kees Cook
2023-08-31  5:32       ` Jiri Slaby
2023-08-31 14:21         ` Azeem Shaikh
2023-08-31 18:30         ` Kees Cook
2023-08-30 19:27 ` Kees Cook

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