From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
To: joao@overdrivepizza.com
Cc: pablo@netfilter.org, netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org,
coreteam@netfilter.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kadlec@netfilter.org, fw@strlen.de,
davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com, pabeni@redhat.com,
rkannoth@marvell.com, wojciech.drewek@intel.com,
steen.hegenlund@microhip.com, keescook@chromium.org,
Joao Moreira <joao.moreira@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] Prevent potential write out of bounds
Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2023 18:28:00 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230831182800.25e5d4d9@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230901010437.126631-1-joao@overdrivepizza.com>
On Thu, 31 Aug 2023 18:04:35 -0700 joao@overdrivepizza.com wrote:
> The function flow_rule_alloc in net/core/flow_offload.c [2] gets an
> unsigned int num_actions (line 10) and later traverses the actions in
> the rule (line 24) setting hw.stats to FLOW_ACTION_HW_STATS_DONT_CARE.
>
> Within the same file, the loop in the line 24 compares a signed int
> (i) to an unsigned int (num_actions), and then uses i as an array
> index. If an integer overflow happens, then the array within the loop
> is wrongly indexed, causing a write out of bounds.
>
> After checking with maintainers, it seems that the front-end caps the
> maximum value of num_action, thus it is not possible to reach the given
> write out of bounds, yet, still, to prevent disasters it is better to
> fix the signedness here.
How did you find this? The commit messages should include info
about how the issue was discovered.
--
pw-bot: cr
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-09-01 1:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-09-01 1:04 [PATCH 0/2] Prevent potential write out of bounds joao
2023-09-01 1:04 ` [PATCH 1/2] Make loop indexes unsigned joao
2023-09-01 1:04 ` [PATCH 2/2] Ensure num_actions is not a negative joao
2023-09-01 8:58 ` Pablo Neira Ayuso
2023-09-01 1:28 ` Jakub Kicinski [this message]
2023-09-01 5:46 ` [PATCH 0/2] Prevent potential write out of bounds Joao Moreira
2023-09-01 8:15 ` Pablo Neira Ayuso
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