From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8D19E13ADB for ; Fri, 29 Dec 2023 20:00:35 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux-foundation.org header.i=@linux-foundation.org header.b="Z0PnHPW2" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 14568C433C8; Fri, 29 Dec 2023 20:00:35 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linux-foundation.org; s=korg; t=1703880035; bh=y3Zom4QOKQE7Mfy6gf1mnzI4Lz+oTTIOv/zjn+GiFs0=; h=Date:To:From:Subject:From; b=Z0PnHPW2+URFiKrs1sQ2RjyMUgWGwSQpX0lqaWcybp5tVRt9PFKfJFC4IyZvteWkZ rq0S7ZAWxl44SEYR8JkFa7h2jv70mKwHWWxfDTqW4nndyuIX/4fCqGhF0Q4TamcPgt 1Z9XbbyS5vwTnqLloEiWtL82X2EoX7drbVW5PFSI= Date: Fri, 29 Dec 2023 12:00:34 -0800 To: mm-commits@vger.kernel.org,ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com,leitao@debian.org,glider@google.com,eugenis@google.com,elver@google.com,dvyukov@google.com,alobakin@pm.me,andreyknvl@google.com,akpm@linux-foundation.org From: Andrew Morton Subject: [merged mm-stable] kasan-move-kasan_mempool_poison_object.patch removed from -mm tree Message-Id: <20231229200035.14568C433C8@smtp.kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: mm-commits@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: The quilt patch titled Subject: kasan: move kasan_mempool_poison_object has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was kasan-move-kasan_mempool_poison_object.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-stable branch of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm ------------------------------------------------------ From: Andrey Konovalov Subject: kasan: move kasan_mempool_poison_object Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2023 23:28:46 +0100 Move kasan_mempool_poison_object after all slab-related KASAN hooks. This is a preparatory change for the following patches in this series. No functional changes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/23ea215409f43c13cdf9ecc454501a264c107d67.1703024586.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Alexander Lobakin Cc: Alexander Potapenko Cc: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: Breno Leitao Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Evgenii Stepanov Cc: Marco Elver Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- include/linux/kasan.h | 16 ++++++------- mm/kasan/common.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) --- a/include/linux/kasan.h~kasan-move-kasan_mempool_poison_object +++ a/include/linux/kasan.h @@ -172,13 +172,6 @@ static __always_inline void kasan_kfree_ __kasan_kfree_large(ptr, _RET_IP_); } -void __kasan_mempool_poison_object(void *ptr, unsigned long ip); -static __always_inline void kasan_mempool_poison_object(void *ptr) -{ - if (kasan_enabled()) - __kasan_mempool_poison_object(ptr, _RET_IP_); -} - void * __must_check __kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, gfp_t flags, bool init); static __always_inline void * __must_check kasan_slab_alloc( @@ -219,6 +212,13 @@ static __always_inline void * __must_che return (void *)object; } +void __kasan_mempool_poison_object(void *ptr, unsigned long ip); +static __always_inline void kasan_mempool_poison_object(void *ptr) +{ + if (kasan_enabled()) + __kasan_mempool_poison_object(ptr, _RET_IP_); +} + /* * Unlike kasan_check_read/write(), kasan_check_byte() is performed even for * the hardware tag-based mode that doesn't rely on compiler instrumentation. @@ -256,7 +256,6 @@ static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struc return false; } static inline void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr) {} -static inline void kasan_mempool_poison_object(void *ptr) {} static inline void *kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, gfp_t flags, bool init) { @@ -276,6 +275,7 @@ static inline void *kasan_krealloc(const { return (void *)object; } +static inline void kasan_mempool_poison_object(void *ptr) {} static inline bool kasan_check_byte(const void *address) { return true; --- a/mm/kasan/common.c~kasan-move-kasan_mempool_poison_object +++ a/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -282,29 +282,6 @@ void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsi ____kasan_kfree_large(ptr, ip); } -void __kasan_mempool_poison_object(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) -{ - struct folio *folio; - - folio = virt_to_folio(ptr); - - /* - * Even though this function is only called for kmem_cache_alloc and - * kmalloc backed mempool allocations, those allocations can still be - * !PageSlab() when the size provided to kmalloc is larger than - * KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, and kmalloc falls back onto page_alloc. - */ - if (unlikely(!folio_test_slab(folio))) { - if (____kasan_kfree_large(ptr, ip)) - return; - kasan_poison(ptr, folio_size(folio), KASAN_PAGE_FREE, false); - } else { - struct slab *slab = folio_slab(folio); - - ____kasan_slab_free(slab->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false, false); - } -} - void * __must_check __kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags, bool init) { @@ -452,6 +429,29 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(con return ____kasan_kmalloc(slab->slab_cache, object, size, flags); } +void __kasan_mempool_poison_object(void *ptr, unsigned long ip) +{ + struct folio *folio; + + folio = virt_to_folio(ptr); + + /* + * Even though this function is only called for kmem_cache_alloc and + * kmalloc backed mempool allocations, those allocations can still be + * !PageSlab() when the size provided to kmalloc is larger than + * KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, and kmalloc falls back onto page_alloc. + */ + if (unlikely(!folio_test_slab(folio))) { + if (____kasan_kfree_large(ptr, ip)) + return; + kasan_poison(ptr, folio_size(folio), KASAN_PAGE_FREE, false); + } else { + struct slab *slab = folio_slab(folio); + + ____kasan_slab_free(slab->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false, false); + } +} + bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *address, unsigned long ip) { if (!kasan_byte_accessible(address)) { _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from andreyknvl@google.com are kasan-stop-leaking-stack-trace-handles.patch