From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8628313AC2 for ; Fri, 29 Dec 2023 20:00:43 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux-foundation.org header.i=@linux-foundation.org header.b="Y3dy1XDQ" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 51B3FC433C8; Fri, 29 Dec 2023 20:00:43 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linux-foundation.org; s=korg; t=1703880043; bh=dFkhS6jEKgBWMNEN7Y4ozgtUWwClddQGWfMp9alN0H4=; h=Date:To:From:Subject:From; b=Y3dy1XDQzl78oVYqS5ZxUnjcN+xdQAZT9+kzK0Sq3S8hV1DfcLVLih6+BZ42A0zXS PMQyjVXINb70Ivt7EQeNs70OHpKA3az2EoBSFyKK3E1g7KEtHCVb/qJKzBZ5gFYiwT MtyWBblu4e1v8npd5GFNHibA2DS0Cof9B5fFid4E= Date: Fri, 29 Dec 2023 12:00:42 -0800 To: mm-commits@vger.kernel.org,ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com,leitao@debian.org,glider@google.com,eugenis@google.com,elver@google.com,dvyukov@google.com,alobakin@pm.me,andreyknvl@google.com,akpm@linux-foundation.org From: Andrew Morton Subject: [merged mm-stable] kasan-clean-up-and-rename-____kasan_kmalloc.patch removed from -mm tree Message-Id: <20231229200043.51B3FC433C8@smtp.kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: mm-commits@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: The quilt patch titled Subject: kasan: clean up and rename ____kasan_kmalloc has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was kasan-clean-up-and-rename-____kasan_kmalloc.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-stable branch of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm ------------------------------------------------------ From: Andrey Konovalov Subject: kasan: clean up and rename ____kasan_kmalloc Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2023 23:28:54 +0100 Introduce a new poison_kmalloc_redzone helper function that poisons the redzone for kmalloc object. Drop the confusingly named ____kasan_kmalloc function and instead use poison_kmalloc_redzone along with the other required parts of ____kasan_kmalloc in the callers' code. This is a preparatory change for the following patches in this series. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/5881232ad357ec0d59a5b1aefd9e0673a386399a.1703024586.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Alexander Lobakin Cc: Alexander Potapenko Cc: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: Breno Leitao Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Evgenii Stepanov Cc: Marco Elver Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- mm/kasan/common.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) --- a/mm/kasan/common.c~kasan-clean-up-and-rename-____kasan_kmalloc +++ a/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -312,26 +312,12 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_slab_alloc(s return tagged_object; } -static inline void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, +static inline void poison_kmalloc_redzone(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags) { unsigned long redzone_start; unsigned long redzone_end; - if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags)) - kasan_quarantine_reduce(); - - if (unlikely(object == NULL)) - return NULL; - - if (is_kfence_address(kasan_reset_tag(object))) - return (void *)object; - - /* - * The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_slab_alloc() for - * kmalloc() or by kasan_krealloc() for krealloc(). - */ - /* * The redzone has byte-level precision for the generic mode. * Partially poison the last object granule to cover the unaligned @@ -355,14 +341,25 @@ static inline void *____kasan_kmalloc(st if (kasan_stack_collection_enabled() && is_kmalloc_cache(cache)) kasan_save_alloc_info(cache, (void *)object, flags); - /* Keep the tag that was set by kasan_slab_alloc(). */ - return (void *)object; } void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags) { - return ____kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, size, flags); + if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags)) + kasan_quarantine_reduce(); + + if (unlikely(object == NULL)) + return NULL; + + if (is_kfence_address(kasan_reset_tag(object))) + return (void *)object; + + /* The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_slab_alloc(). */ + poison_kmalloc_redzone(cache, object, size, flags); + + /* Keep the tag that was set by kasan_slab_alloc(). */ + return (void *)object; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_kmalloc); @@ -408,6 +405,9 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(con if (unlikely(object == ZERO_SIZE_PTR)) return (void *)object; + if (is_kfence_address(kasan_reset_tag(object))) + return (void *)object; + /* * Unpoison the object's data. * Part of it might already have been unpoisoned, but it's unknown @@ -420,8 +420,10 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(con /* Piggy-back on kmalloc() instrumentation to poison the redzone. */ if (unlikely(!slab)) return __kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags); - else - return ____kasan_kmalloc(slab->slab_cache, object, size, flags); + else { + poison_kmalloc_redzone(slab->slab_cache, object, size, flags); + return (void *)object; + } } bool __kasan_mempool_poison_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from andreyknvl@google.com are kasan-stop-leaking-stack-trace-handles.patch