From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A2B7A13AF3 for ; Fri, 29 Dec 2023 20:00:44 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux-foundation.org header.i=@linux-foundation.org header.b="B1IoHuPb" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 6C68BC433C9; Fri, 29 Dec 2023 20:00:44 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linux-foundation.org; s=korg; t=1703880044; bh=xnQfkbuVbUnLJ+GCg6ebAvwIOihbR9WVbC+phbRrwd0=; h=Date:To:From:Subject:From; b=B1IoHuPbAJlz7FCJdp/OrjFcTXzYkg7RQ6+mg/HVFpe7BCc4tPYgnMu1rG1NZEDft uznZS2gxTsCpIFWLraAbJY2SYA8EDJhQHp9UQR5vCsGzqy+BriwpFpnCJdQPc+gJPi YZeDKSmqiLNTfBrnD6nO1LeIogbSgmaYYsBBwAVk= Date: Fri, 29 Dec 2023 12:00:43 -0800 To: mm-commits@vger.kernel.org,ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com,leitao@debian.org,glider@google.com,eugenis@google.com,elver@google.com,dvyukov@google.com,alobakin@pm.me,andreyknvl@google.com,akpm@linux-foundation.org From: Andrew Morton Subject: [merged mm-stable] kasan-introduce-poison_kmalloc_large_redzone.patch removed from -mm tree Message-Id: <20231229200044.6C68BC433C9@smtp.kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: mm-commits@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: The quilt patch titled Subject: kasan: introduce poison_kmalloc_large_redzone has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was kasan-introduce-poison_kmalloc_large_redzone.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-stable branch of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm ------------------------------------------------------ From: Andrey Konovalov Subject: kasan: introduce poison_kmalloc_large_redzone Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2023 23:28:55 +0100 Split out a poison_kmalloc_large_redzone helper from __kasan_kmalloc_large and use it in the caller's code. This is a preparatory change for the following patches in this series. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/93317097b668519d76097fb065201b2027436e22.1703024586.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Alexander Lobakin Cc: Alexander Potapenko Cc: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: Breno Leitao Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Evgenii Stepanov Cc: Marco Elver Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- mm/kasan/common.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) --- a/mm/kasan/common.c~kasan-introduce-poison_kmalloc_large_redzone +++ a/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -363,23 +363,12 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc(stru } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_kmalloc); -void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size, +static inline void poison_kmalloc_large_redzone(const void *ptr, size_t size, gfp_t flags) { unsigned long redzone_start; unsigned long redzone_end; - if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags)) - kasan_quarantine_reduce(); - - if (unlikely(ptr == NULL)) - return NULL; - - /* - * The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_unpoison_pages() for - * alloc_pages() or by kasan_krealloc() for krealloc(). - */ - /* * The redzone has byte-level precision for the generic mode. * Partially poison the last object granule to cover the unaligned @@ -389,12 +378,25 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_larg kasan_poison_last_granule(ptr, size); /* Poison the aligned part of the redzone. */ - redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size), - KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); + redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size), KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(virt_to_page(ptr)); kasan_poison((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start, KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE, false); +} + +void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size, + gfp_t flags) +{ + if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags)) + kasan_quarantine_reduce(); + + if (unlikely(ptr == NULL)) + return NULL; + /* The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_unpoison_pages(). */ + poison_kmalloc_large_redzone(ptr, size, flags); + + /* Keep the tag that was set by alloc_pages(). */ return (void *)ptr; } @@ -402,6 +404,9 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(con { struct slab *slab; + if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags)) + kasan_quarantine_reduce(); + if (unlikely(object == ZERO_SIZE_PTR)) return (void *)object; @@ -419,11 +424,11 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(con /* Piggy-back on kmalloc() instrumentation to poison the redzone. */ if (unlikely(!slab)) - return __kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags); - else { + poison_kmalloc_large_redzone(object, size, flags); + else poison_kmalloc_redzone(slab->slab_cache, object, size, flags); - return (void *)object; - } + + return (void *)object; } bool __kasan_mempool_poison_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from andreyknvl@google.com are kasan-stop-leaking-stack-trace-handles.patch