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From: hare@kernel.org
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>, Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>,
	linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org, Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Subject: [PATCH 07/13] nvme-tcp: check for invalidated or revoked key
Date: Sat, 27 Jan 2024 10:30:52 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240127093058.15699-8-hare@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240127093058.15699-1-hare@kernel.org>

From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>

key_lookup() will always return a key, even if that key is revoked
or invalidated. So check for invalid keys before continuing.

Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
---
 drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c | 7 ++++++-
 drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c   | 9 +++++++--
 drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c     | 8 +++++++-
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
index aa88606a44c4..a7da088331dc 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
@@ -635,7 +635,12 @@ static struct key *nvmf_parse_key(int key_id)
 	key = key_lookup(key_id);
 	if (!IS_ERR(key))
 		pr_err("key id %08x not found\n", key_id);
-	else
+	else if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &key->flags) ||
+		 test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED, &key->flags)) {
+		pr_err("key id %08x invalid\n", key_id);
+		key_put(key);
+		key = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
+	} else
 		pr_debug("Using key id %08x\n", key_id);
 	return key;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c b/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c
index 754e91111042..1076b5b59b35 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c
@@ -617,10 +617,15 @@ static ssize_t tls_key_show(struct device *dev,
 			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 {
 	struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+	struct key *key = ctrl->tls_key;
 
-	if (!ctrl->tls_key)
+	if (!key)
 		return 0;
-	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%08x", key_serial(ctrl->tls_key));
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &key->flags) ||
+	    test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED, &key->flags))
+		return -EKEYREVOKED;
+
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%08x", key_serial(key));
 }
 static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(tls_key);
 #endif
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c b/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c
index c160b1a64ec0..65d9a817e752 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c
@@ -1571,9 +1571,15 @@ static void nvme_tcp_tls_done(void *data, int status, key_serial_t pskid)
 
 	tls_key = key_lookup(pskid);
 	if (IS_ERR(tls_key)) {
-		dev_warn(ctrl->ctrl.device, "queue %d: Invalid key %x\n",
+		dev_warn(ctrl->ctrl.device, "queue %d: key %08x not found\n",
 			 qid, pskid);
 		queue->tls_err = -ENOKEY;
+	} else if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &tls_key->flags) ||
+		   test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED, &tls_key->flags)) {
+		dev_warn(ctrl->ctrl.device, "queue %d: key %08x invalid\n",
+			 qid, pskid);
+		key_put(tls_key);
+		queue->tls_err = -EKEYREVOKED;
 	} else {
 		ctrl->ctrl.tls_key = tls_key;
 		queue->tls_err = 0;
-- 
2.35.3



  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-01-27  9:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-01-27  9:30 [PATCHv2 00/13] nvme: implement secure concatenation hare
2024-01-27  9:30 ` [PATCH 01/13] crypto,fs: Separate out hkdf_extract() and hkdf_expand() hare
2024-01-27  9:30 ` [PATCH 02/13] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_psk() hare
2024-03-07 10:42   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-01-27  9:30 ` [PATCH 03/13] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_digest() hare
2024-03-07 10:44   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-01-27  9:30 ` [PATCH 04/13] nvme: add nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk() hare
2024-01-27  9:30 ` [PATCH 05/13] nvme-keyring: add nvme_tls_psk_refresh() hare
2024-01-27  9:30 ` [PATCH 06/13] nvme-keyring: restrict match length for version '1' identifiers hare
2024-03-07 10:49   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-07 11:35     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-03-07 12:08       ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-07 12:13         ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-01-27  9:30 ` hare [this message]
2024-03-07 10:51   ` [PATCH 07/13] nvme-tcp: check for invalidated or revoked key Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-07 11:36     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-01-27  9:30 ` [PATCH 08/13] nvme-fabrics: authentication errors are not retryable hare
2024-03-07 10:52   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-07 11:37     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-01-27  9:30 ` [PATCH 09/13] nvme-tcp: sanitize TLS key handling hare
2024-03-07 11:03   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-07 11:42     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-01-27  9:30 ` [PATCH 10/13] nvme-tcp: request secure channel concatenation hare
2024-01-27  9:30 ` [PATCH 11/13] nvme-tcp: combine reset and recovery hare
2024-03-07 11:08   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-03-07 11:43     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-01-27  9:30 ` [PATCH 12/13] nvme-tcp: reset after recovery for secure concatenation hare
2024-01-27  9:30 ` [PATCH 13/13] nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation hare
2024-02-12  7:40 ` [PATCHv2 00/13] nvme: implement secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke

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