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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
	Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>, Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	"linux-hardening @ vger . kernel . org"
	<linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Take return from set_memory_ro() into account with bpf_prog_lock_ro()
Date: Sun, 18 Feb 2024 07:06:19 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202402180701.FA42F70BE2@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <135feeafe6fe8d412e90865622e9601403c42be5.1708253445.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>

On Sun, Feb 18, 2024 at 11:55:01AM +0100, Christophe Leroy wrote:
> set_memory_ro() can fail, leaving memory unprotected.
> 
> Check its return and take it into account as an error.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
> ---
>  include/linux/filter.h | 5 +++--
>  kernel/bpf/core.c      | 4 +++-
>  kernel/bpf/verifier.c  | 4 +++-
>  3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h
> index fee070b9826e..fc0994dc5c72 100644
> --- a/include/linux/filter.h
> +++ b/include/linux/filter.h
> @@ -881,14 +881,15 @@ bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset(u32 off, u32 size, u32 size_default)
>  
>  #define bpf_classic_proglen(fprog) (fprog->len * sizeof(fprog->filter[0]))
>  
> -static inline void bpf_prog_lock_ro(struct bpf_prog *fp)
> +static inline int __must_check bpf_prog_lock_ro(struct bpf_prog *fp)
>  {
>  #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
>  	if (!fp->jited) {
>  		set_vm_flush_reset_perms(fp);
> -		set_memory_ro((unsigned long)fp, fp->pages);
> +		return set_memory_ro((unsigned long)fp, fp->pages);
>  	}
>  #endif
> +	return 0;
>  }
>  
>  static inline void bpf_jit_binary_lock_ro(struct bpf_binary_header *hdr)
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
> index 71c459a51d9e..c49619ef55d0 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
> @@ -2392,7 +2392,9 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_select_runtime(struct bpf_prog *fp, int *err)
>  	}
>  
>  finalize:
> -	bpf_prog_lock_ro(fp);
> +	*err = bpf_prog_lock_ro(fp);
> +	if (*err)
> +		return fp;

Weird error path, but yes.

>  
>  	/* The tail call compatibility check can only be done at
>  	 * this late stage as we need to determine, if we deal
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index c5d68a9d8acc..1f831a6b4bbc 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -19020,7 +19020,9 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
>  	 * bpf_prog_load will add the kallsyms for the main program.
>  	 */
>  	for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
> -		bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]);
> +		err = bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]);
> +		if (err)
> +			goto out_free;
>  		bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]);
>  	}

Just to double-check if memory permissions being correctly restored on
this error path, I walked back through it and see that it ultimately
lands on vfree(), which appears to just throw the entire mapping away,
so I think that's safe. :)

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-- 
Kees Cook

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-02-18 15:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-18 10:55 [PATCH bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Take return from set_memory_ro() into account with bpf_prog_lock_ro() Christophe Leroy
2024-02-18 10:55 ` [PATCH bpf-next 2/2] bpf: Take return from set_memory_rox() into account with bpf_jit_binary_lock_ro() Christophe Leroy
2024-02-18 15:19   ` Kees Cook
2024-02-19 15:06   ` Puranjay Mohan
2024-02-19 15:33   ` Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-02-20  1:22   ` Tiezhu Yang
2024-02-20  8:56   ` Johan Almbladh
2024-02-18 15:06 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2024-02-19  1:40 ` [PATCH bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Take return from set_memory_ro() into account with bpf_prog_lock_ro() Hengqi Chen
2024-02-19  6:39   ` Christophe Leroy
2024-02-21 17:30     ` Daniel Borkmann
2024-02-22  8:53       ` Christophe Leroy

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