From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@collabora.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, kernel@collabora.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>,
Doug Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Mike Frysinger <vapier@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] proc: allow restricting /proc/pid/mem writes
Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2024 09:56:03 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202403040951.C63C3DF5@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3a1eb-65e5dc00-15-364077c0@216340496>
On Mon, Mar 04, 2024 at 02:35:29PM +0000, Adrian Ratiu wrote:
> Yes, easy to block and also respect page permissions (can't write
> read-only memory) as well as require ptrace access anyway by checking
> PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS.
right, I don't think process_vm_writev() ignores page permissions? i.e. I
don't see where it is using FOLL_FORCE, which is one of the central
problems with /proc/$pid/mem. (Which reminds me, this is worth mentioning
more explicitly in the commit log for v3.)
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-03-04 17:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-03-01 21:34 [PATCH v2] proc: allow restricting /proc/pid/mem writes Adrian Ratiu
2024-03-01 23:55 ` Kees Cook
2024-03-02 10:31 ` Adrian Ratiu
2024-03-04 14:06 ` Adrian Ratiu
2024-03-04 17:42 ` Kees Cook
2024-03-04 13:20 ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-04 13:48 ` Adrian Ratiu
2024-03-04 14:05 ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-04 14:35 ` Adrian Ratiu
2024-03-04 17:56 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2024-03-04 17:49 ` Kees Cook
2024-03-05 8:59 ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-05 9:41 ` Kees Cook
2024-03-05 9:58 ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-05 10:12 ` Kees Cook
2024-03-05 10:32 ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-05 18:37 ` Kees Cook
2024-03-05 19:34 ` Adrian Ratiu
2024-03-05 19:38 ` Kees Cook
2024-03-06 10:31 ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-05 11:03 ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-05 18:33 ` Kees Cook
2024-03-06 10:49 ` Matt Denton
2024-03-05 15:38 ` Adrian Ratiu
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