From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
To: davem@davemloft.net
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, edumazet@google.com, pabeni@redhat.com,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
dsahern@kernel.org, borisp@nvidia.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com
Subject: [PATCH net-next] net: skbuff: generalize the skb->decrypted bit
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2024 13:21:39 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240403202139.1978143-1-kuba@kernel.org> (raw)
The ->decrypted bit can be reused for other crypto protocols.
Remove the direct dependency on TLS, add helpers to clean up
the ifdefs leaking out everywhere.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
---
I'm going to post PSP support.. as soon as the test groundwork
is in place. I think this stands on its own as a cleanup.
CC: dsahern@kernel.org
CC: borisp@nvidia.com
CC: john.fastabend@gmail.com
---
include/linux/skbuff.h | 15 ++++++++++++---
include/net/sock.h | 4 +---
net/Kconfig | 3 +++
net/core/sock.c | 5 ++---
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 12 +++---------
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 4 +---
net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c | 4 +---
net/tls/Kconfig | 1 +
8 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h
index 03ea36a82cdd..7dfb906d92f7 100644
--- a/include/linux/skbuff.h
+++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h
@@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ struct sk_buff {
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER_SKIP_EGRESS
__u8 nf_skip_egress:1;
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE
+#ifdef CONFIG_SKB_DECRYPTED
__u8 decrypted:1;
#endif
__u8 slow_gro:1;
@@ -1615,17 +1615,26 @@ static inline void skb_copy_hash(struct sk_buff *to, const struct sk_buff *from)
static inline int skb_cmp_decrypted(const struct sk_buff *skb1,
const struct sk_buff *skb2)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE
+#ifdef CONFIG_SKB_DECRYPTED
return skb2->decrypted - skb1->decrypted;
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
+static inline bool skb_is_decrypted(const struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SKB_DECRYPTED
+ return skb->decrypted;
+#else
+ return false;
+#endif
+}
+
static inline void skb_copy_decrypted(struct sk_buff *to,
const struct sk_buff *from)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE
+#ifdef CONFIG_SKB_DECRYPTED
to->decrypted = from->decrypted;
#endif
}
diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h
index 2253eefe2848..a495330c5c49 100644
--- a/include/net/sock.h
+++ b/include/net/sock.h
@@ -2835,12 +2835,10 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *sk_validate_xmit_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (sk && sk_fullsock(sk) && sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb) {
skb = sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb(sk, dev, skb);
-#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE
- } else if (unlikely(skb->decrypted)) {
+ } else if (unlikely(skb_is_decrypted(skb))) {
pr_warn_ratelimited("unencrypted skb with no associated socket - dropping\n");
kfree_skb(skb);
skb = NULL;
-#endif
}
#endif
diff --git a/net/Kconfig b/net/Kconfig
index 3e57ccf0da27..d5ab791f7afa 100644
--- a/net/Kconfig
+++ b/net/Kconfig
@@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ config NET_XGRESS
config NET_REDIRECT
bool
+config SKB_DECRYPTED
+ bool
+
config SKB_EXTENSIONS
bool
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index 5ed411231fc7..fe9195186c13 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -2526,13 +2526,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(skb_set_owner_w);
static bool can_skb_orphan_partial(const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE
/* Drivers depend on in-order delivery for crypto offload,
* partial orphan breaks out-of-order-OK logic.
*/
- if (skb->decrypted)
+ if (skb_is_decrypted(skb))
return false;
-#endif
+
return (skb->destructor == sock_wfree ||
(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) && skb->destructor == tcp_wfree));
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index 1b6cd3840012..9fb9d704c4d9 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -4803,10 +4803,8 @@ static bool tcp_try_coalesce(struct sock *sk,
if (!mptcp_skb_can_collapse(to, from))
return false;
-#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE
- if (from->decrypted != to->decrypted)
+ if (skb_cmp_decrypted(from, to))
return false;
-#endif
if (!skb_try_coalesce(to, from, fragstolen, &delta))
return false;
@@ -5375,9 +5373,7 @@ tcp_collapse(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff_head *list, struct rb_root *root,
break;
memcpy(nskb->cb, skb->cb, sizeof(skb->cb));
-#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE
- nskb->decrypted = skb->decrypted;
-#endif
+ skb_copy_decrypted(nskb, skb);
TCP_SKB_CB(nskb)->seq = TCP_SKB_CB(nskb)->end_seq = start;
if (list)
__skb_queue_before(list, skb, nskb);
@@ -5407,10 +5403,8 @@ tcp_collapse(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff_head *list, struct rb_root *root,
!mptcp_skb_can_collapse(nskb, skb) ||
(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags & (TCPHDR_SYN | TCPHDR_FIN)))
goto end;
-#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE
- if (skb->decrypted != nskb->decrypted)
+ if (skb_cmp_decrypted(skb, nskb))
goto end;
-#endif
}
}
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index 1e0a9762f92e..004e5d67c1d3 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -2045,10 +2045,8 @@ bool tcp_add_backlog(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags) & TCPHDR_ACK) ||
((TCP_SKB_CB(tail)->tcp_flags ^
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags) & (TCPHDR_ECE | TCPHDR_CWR)) ||
-#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE
- tail->decrypted != skb->decrypted ||
-#endif
!mptcp_skb_can_collapse(tail, skb) ||
+ skb_cmp_decrypted(tail, skb) ||
thtail->doff != th->doff ||
memcmp(thtail + 1, th + 1, hdrlen - sizeof(*th)))
goto no_coalesce;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c
index ebe4722bb020..fab0973f995b 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c
@@ -265,9 +265,7 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_gro_receive(struct list_head *head, struct sk_buff *skb)
flush |= (len - 1) >= mss;
flush |= (ntohl(th2->seq) + skb_gro_len(p)) ^ ntohl(th->seq);
-#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE
- flush |= p->decrypted ^ skb->decrypted;
-#endif
+ flush |= skb_cmp_decrypted(p, skb);
if (flush || skb_gro_receive(p, skb)) {
mss = 1;
diff --git a/net/tls/Kconfig b/net/tls/Kconfig
index 0cdc1f7b6b08..ce8d56a19187 100644
--- a/net/tls/Kconfig
+++ b/net/tls/Kconfig
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ config TLS
config TLS_DEVICE
bool "Transport Layer Security HW offload"
depends on TLS
+ select SKB_DECRYPTED
select SOCK_VALIDATE_XMIT
select SOCK_RX_QUEUE_MAPPING
default n
--
2.44.0
next reply other threads:[~2024-04-03 20:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-03 20:21 Jakub Kicinski [this message]
2024-04-03 20:58 ` [PATCH net-next] net: skbuff: generalize the skb->decrypted bit David Ahern
2024-04-06 16:40 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
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