From: peterx@redhat.com
To: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
peterx@redhat.com, Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
syzbot+b07c8ac8eee3d4d8440f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Subject: [PATCH] mm/userfaultfd: Allow hugetlb change protection upon poison entry
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2024 19:19:20 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240405231920.1772199-1-peterx@redhat.com> (raw)
From: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
After UFFDIO_POISON, there can be two kinds of hugetlb pte markers, either
the POISON one or UFFD_WP one.
Allow change protection to run on a poisoned marker just like !hugetlb
cases, ignoring the marker irrelevant of the permission.
Here the two bits are mutual exclusive. For example, when install a
poisoned entry it must not be UFFD_WP already (by checking pte_none()
before such install). And it also means if UFFD_WP is set there must have
no POISON bit set. It makes sense because UFFD_WP is a bit to reflect
permission, and permissions do not apply if the pte is poisoned and
destined to sigbus.
So here we simply check uffd_wp bit set first, do nothing otherwise.
Attach the Fixes to UFFDIO_POISON work, as before that it should not be
possible to have poison entry for hugetlb (e.g., hugetlb doesn't do swap,
so no chance of swapin errors).
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.6+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000920d5e0615602dd1@google.com
Reported-by: syzbot+b07c8ac8eee3d4d8440f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: fc71884a5f59 ("mm: userfaultfd: add new UFFDIO_POISON ioctl")
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
---
mm/hugetlb.c | 10 +++++++---
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/hugetlb.c b/mm/hugetlb.c
index 8267e221ca5d..ba7162441adf 100644
--- a/mm/hugetlb.c
+++ b/mm/hugetlb.c
@@ -6960,9 +6960,13 @@ long hugetlb_change_protection(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
if (!pte_same(pte, newpte))
set_huge_pte_at(mm, address, ptep, newpte, psize);
} else if (unlikely(is_pte_marker(pte))) {
- /* No other markers apply for now. */
- WARN_ON_ONCE(!pte_marker_uffd_wp(pte));
- if (uffd_wp_resolve)
+ /*
+ * Do nothing on a poison marker; page is
+ * corrupted, permissons do not apply. Here
+ * pte_marker_uffd_wp()==true implies !poison
+ * because they're mutual exclusive.
+ */
+ if (pte_marker_uffd_wp(pte) && uffd_wp_resolve)
/* Safe to modify directly (non-present->none). */
huge_pte_clear(mm, address, ptep, psize);
} else if (!huge_pte_none(pte)) {
--
2.44.0
next reply other threads:[~2024-04-05 23:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-05 23:19 peterx [this message]
2024-04-08 18:59 ` [PATCH] mm/userfaultfd: Allow hugetlb change protection upon poison entry David Hildenbrand
2024-04-08 20:39 ` Axel Rasmussen
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