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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: CVE-2024-26774: ext4: avoid dividing by 0 in mb_update_avg_fragment_size() when block bitmap corrupt
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2024 18:12:04 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2024041721-reboot-squall-310e@gregkh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240417145446.uh2rqcbxlebnkbfm@quack3>

On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 04:54:46PM +0200, Jan Kara wrote:
> On Wed 17-04-24 15:30:03, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 01:43:24PM +0200, Jan Kara wrote:
> > > Hello!
> > > 
> > > On Wed 03-04-24 19:31:41, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > > > Description
> > > > ===========
> > > > 
> > > > In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
> > > > 
> > > > ext4: avoid dividing by 0 in mb_update_avg_fragment_size() when block bitmap corrupt
> > > > 
> > > > Determine if bb_fragments is 0 instead of determining bb_free to eliminate
> > > > the risk of dividing by zero when the block bitmap is corrupted.
> > > > 
> > > > The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2024-26774 to this issue.
> > > 
> > > I'd like to understand what is the imagined security threat fixed by this
> > > patch (as multiple patches of similar nature got assigned a CVE). The patch
> > > fixes a bug that if a corrupted filesystem is read-write mounted, we can do
> > > division-by-zero. Now if you can make the system mount a corrupted
> > > filesystem, you can do many interesting things to the system other than
> > > create a division by zero... So what is the presumed threat model here?
> > 
> > Exactly what you said, "if you mount a corrupted file system, you will
> > get a divide by zero fault."
> > 
> > Many systems auto-mount any filesystem plugged into it.  If yours do
> > not, then yours does not need to worry about this type of CVE.
> 
> OK, understood. But let me state that with the current state of affairs in
> the filesystem land, it will not take a determined attacker long to get
> arbitrary code execution out of "maliciously corrupted fs mounted". The
> code of most filesystems has simply never been written with the assumption
> that it can be presented with malicious data and we have hundreds of
> thousands lines of code like that. We have fixed the most glaring problems
> but by far not all (partly because of performance and maintenance costs,
> partly because they are baked into on-disk formats).

I totally agree.  It's up to the distros to stop doing this if they wish
to stop this problem from happening.

thanks,

greg k-h

      parent reply	other threads:[~2024-04-17 16:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-03 17:31 CVE-2024-26774: ext4: avoid dividing by 0 in mb_update_avg_fragment_size() when block bitmap corrupt Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-04-17 11:43 ` Jan Kara
2024-04-17 13:30   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-04-17 14:54     ` Jan Kara
2024-04-17 15:29       ` Theodore Ts'o
2024-04-17 16:12       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]

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