From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
<linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
<mingo@redhat.com>, <jroedel@suse.de>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
<hpa@zytor.com>, <ardb@kernel.org>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
<seanjc@google.com>, <vkuznets@redhat.com>, <jmattson@google.com>,
<luto@kernel.org>, <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
<slp@redhat.com>, <pgonda@google.com>, <peterz@infradead.org>,
<srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>, <rientjes@google.com>,
<dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>, <tobin@ibm.com>, <bp@alien8.de>,
<vbabka@suse.cz>, <kirill@shutemov.name>, <ak@linux.intel.com>,
<tony.luck@intel.com>,
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
<alpergun@google.com>, <jarkko@kernel.org>,
<ashish.kalra@amd.com>, <nikunj.dadhania@amd.com>,
<pankaj.gupta@amd.com>, <liam.merwick@oracle.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v13 08/26] KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2024 14:41:15 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240418194133.1452059-9-michael.roth@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240418194133.1452059-1-michael.roth@amd.com>
SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding
new hardware-based security protection. SEV-SNP adds strong memory
encryption and integrity protection to help prevent malicious
hypervisor-based attacks such as data replay, memory re-mapping, and
more, to create an isolated execution environment.
Define a new KVM_X86_SNP_VM type which makes use of these capabilities
and extend the KVM_SEV_INIT2 ioctl to support it. Also add a basic
helper to check whether SNP is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[mdr: commit fixups, use similar ASID reporting as with SEV/SEV-ES]
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 3 ++-
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 12 ++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +-
6 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index 728c98175b9c..544a43c1cf11 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -285,7 +285,8 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AVIC_
#define AVIC_HPA_MASK ~((0xFFFULL << 52) | 0xFFF)
-#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5)
+#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE BIT(0)
+#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5)
struct vmcb_seg {
u16 selector;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 72ad5ace118d..9a8b81d20314 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -872,5 +872,6 @@ struct kvm_hyperv_eventfd {
#define KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM 1
#define KVM_X86_SEV_VM 2
#define KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM 3
+#define KVM_X86_SNP_VM 4
#endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 1d2264e93afe..c41cc73a1efe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
static bool sev_es_enabled = true;
module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
+/* enable/disable SEV-SNP support */
+static bool sev_snp_enabled;
+
/* enable/disable SEV-ES DebugSwap support */
static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = true;
module_param_named(debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool, 0444);
@@ -275,6 +278,9 @@ static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
sev->es_active = es_active;
sev->vmsa_features = data->vmsa_features;
+ if (vm_type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM)
+ sev->vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE;
+
ret = sev_asid_new(sev);
if (ret)
goto e_no_asid;
@@ -326,7 +332,8 @@ static int sev_guest_init2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
return -EINVAL;
if (kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_VM &&
- kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM)
+ kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM &&
+ kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SNP_VM)
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&data, u64_to_user_ptr(argp->data), sizeof(data)))
@@ -2306,11 +2313,16 @@ void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void)
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
kvm_caps.supported_vm_types |= BIT(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM);
}
+ if (sev_snp_enabled) {
+ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP);
+ kvm_caps.supported_vm_types |= BIT(KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
+ }
}
void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
{
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sev_asid_count, sev_es_asid_count;
+ bool sev_snp_supported = false;
bool sev_es_supported = false;
bool sev_supported = false;
@@ -2391,6 +2403,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
sev_es_asid_count = min_sev_asid - 1;
WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count));
sev_es_supported = true;
+ sev_snp_supported = sev_snp_enabled && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
out:
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
@@ -2403,9 +2416,15 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
pr_info("SEV-ES %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n",
sev_es_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled",
min_sev_asid > 1 ? 1 : 0, min_sev_asid - 1);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
+ pr_info("SEV-SNP %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n",
+ sev_snp_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled",
+ min_sev_asid > 1 ? 1 : 0, min_sev_asid - 1);
sev_enabled = sev_supported;
sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
+ sev_snp_enabled = sev_snp_supported;
+
if (!sev_es_enabled || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP) ||
!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP))
sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = false;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 535018f152a3..d31404953bf1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -4899,7 +4899,8 @@ static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
if (type != KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM &&
type != KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM) {
- kvm->arch.has_protected_state = (type == KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM);
+ kvm->arch.has_protected_state =
+ (type == KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM || type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
to_kvm_sev_info(kvm)->need_init = true;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 6fd0f5862681..7f2e9c7fc4ca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -348,6 +348,18 @@ static __always_inline bool sev_es_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
#endif
}
+static __always_inline bool sev_snp_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+
+ return (sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE) &&
+ !WARN_ON_ONCE(!sev_es_guest(kvm));
+#else
+ return false;
+#endif
+}
+
static inline void vmcb_mark_all_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb)
{
vmcb->control.clean = 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 83b8260443a3..9923921904a2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -12598,7 +12598,7 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)
kvm->arch.vm_type = type;
kvm->arch.has_private_mem =
- (type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM);
+ (type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM || type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
ret = kvm_page_track_init(kvm);
if (ret)
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-18 19:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-18 19:41 [PATCH v13 00/26] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 01/26] [TEMP] x86/kvm/Kconfig: Have KVM_AMD_SEV select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 02/26] [TEMP] x86/cc: Add cc_platform_set/_clear() helpers Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 03/26] [TEMP] x86/CPU/AMD: Track SNP host status with cc_platform_*() Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 04/26] KVM: guest_memfd: Fix PTR_ERR() handling in __kvm_gmem_get_pfn() Michael Roth
2024-04-19 12:58 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-04-19 15:11 ` Michael Roth
2024-04-19 16:17 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 05/26] KVM: SEV: Select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 06/26] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 07/26] KVM: SEV: Add GHCB handling for Hypervisor Feature Support requests Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` Michael Roth [this message]
2024-04-19 11:58 ` [PATCH v13 08/26] KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 09/26] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2024-04-19 11:52 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-19 14:19 ` Michael Roth
2024-04-19 16:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-24 21:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 10/26] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2024-04-19 11:56 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-19 16:12 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-21 17:52 ` Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 11/26] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 12/26] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 13/26] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 14/26] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 15/26] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 16/26] KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2024-04-19 12:01 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 17/26] KVM: SEV: Add support for GHCB-based termination requests Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 18/26] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 19/26] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 20/26] KVM: x86: Implement gmem hook for determining max NPT mapping level Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 21/26] KVM: SEV: Avoid WBINVD for HVA-based MMU notifications for SNP Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 22/26] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 23/26] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 24/26] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_VLEK_LOAD command Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 25/26] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{PAUSE,RESUME}_ATTESTATION commands Michael Roth
2024-04-18 19:41 ` [PATCH v13 26/26] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_EXTENDED_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2024-04-19 12:04 ` [PATCH v13 00/26] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-21 18:00 ` Michael Roth
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