From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+git@google.com>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH for-stable-6.1 21/23] x86/sme: Move early SME kernel encryption handling into .head.text
Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2024 10:11:27 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240419081105.3817596-46-ardb+git@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240419081105.3817596-25-ardb+git@google.com>
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
[ Commit 48204aba801f1b512b3abed10b8e1a63e03f3dd1 upstream ]
The .head.text section is the initial primary entrypoint of the core
kernel, and is entered with the CPU executing from a 1:1 mapping of
memory. Such code must never access global variables using absolute
references, as these are based on the kernel virtual mapping which is
not active yet at this point.
Given that the SME startup code is also called from this early execution
context, move it into .head.text as well. This will allow more thorough
build time checks in the future to ensure that early startup code only
uses RIP-relative references to global variables.
Also replace some occurrences of __pa_symbol() [which relies on the
compiler generating an absolute reference, which is not guaranteed] and
an open coded RIP-relative access with RIP_REL_REF().
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227151907.387873-18-ardb+git@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 8 ++--
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 42 ++++++++------------
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 41d06822bc8c..853f423b1d13 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data);
void __init sme_early_init(void);
void __init sev_setup_arch(void);
-void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp);
-void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp);
+void sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp);
+void sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp);
int __init early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size);
int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size);
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ static inline void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { }
static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { }
static inline void __init sev_setup_arch(void) { }
-static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { }
-static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
+static inline void sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { }
+static inline void sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { }
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
index f7dfc3f89921..f17609884874 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
+#include <asm/init.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
@@ -98,7 +99,7 @@ static char sme_workarea[2 * PMD_SIZE] __section(".init.scratch");
static char sme_cmdline_arg[] __initdata = "mem_encrypt";
static char sme_cmdline_on[] __initdata = "on";
-static void __init sme_clear_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __head sme_clear_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
unsigned long pgd_start, pgd_end, pgd_size;
pgd_t *pgd_p;
@@ -113,7 +114,7 @@ static void __init sme_clear_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
memset(pgd_p, 0, pgd_size);
}
-static pud_t __init *sme_prepare_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static pud_t __head *sme_prepare_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
p4d_t *p4d;
@@ -150,7 +151,7 @@ static pud_t __init *sme_prepare_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
return pud;
}
-static void __init sme_populate_pgd_large(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __head sme_populate_pgd_large(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
@@ -166,7 +167,7 @@ static void __init sme_populate_pgd_large(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(ppd->paddr | ppd->pmd_flags));
}
-static void __init sme_populate_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __head sme_populate_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
@@ -192,7 +193,7 @@ static void __init sme_populate_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
set_pte(pte, __pte(ppd->paddr | ppd->pte_flags));
}
-static void __init __sme_map_range_pmd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __head __sme_map_range_pmd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
while (ppd->vaddr < ppd->vaddr_end) {
sme_populate_pgd_large(ppd);
@@ -202,7 +203,7 @@ static void __init __sme_map_range_pmd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
}
}
-static void __init __sme_map_range_pte(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __head __sme_map_range_pte(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
while (ppd->vaddr < ppd->vaddr_end) {
sme_populate_pgd(ppd);
@@ -212,7 +213,7 @@ static void __init __sme_map_range_pte(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
}
}
-static void __init __sme_map_range(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd,
+static void __head __sme_map_range(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd,
pmdval_t pmd_flags, pteval_t pte_flags)
{
unsigned long vaddr_end;
@@ -236,22 +237,22 @@ static void __init __sme_map_range(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd,
__sme_map_range_pte(ppd);
}
-static void __init sme_map_range_encrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __head sme_map_range_encrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
__sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_ENC, PTE_FLAGS_ENC);
}
-static void __init sme_map_range_decrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __head sme_map_range_decrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
__sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_DEC, PTE_FLAGS_DEC);
}
-static void __init sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __head sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
__sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WP, PTE_FLAGS_DEC_WP);
}
-static unsigned long __init sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len)
+static unsigned long __head sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len)
{
unsigned long entries = 0, tables = 0;
@@ -288,7 +289,7 @@ static unsigned long __init sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len)
return entries + tables;
}
-void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
+void __head sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
{
unsigned long workarea_start, workarea_end, workarea_len;
unsigned long execute_start, execute_end, execute_len;
@@ -323,9 +324,8 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
* memory from being cached.
*/
- /* Physical addresses gives us the identity mapped virtual addresses */
- kernel_start = __pa_symbol(_text);
- kernel_end = ALIGN(__pa_symbol(_end), PMD_SIZE);
+ kernel_start = (unsigned long)RIP_REL_REF(_text);
+ kernel_end = ALIGN((unsigned long)RIP_REL_REF(_end), PMD_SIZE);
kernel_len = kernel_end - kernel_start;
initrd_start = 0;
@@ -342,14 +342,6 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
}
#endif
- /*
- * We're running identity mapped, so we must obtain the address to the
- * SME encryption workarea using rip-relative addressing.
- */
- asm ("lea sme_workarea(%%rip), %0"
- : "=r" (workarea_start)
- : "p" (sme_workarea));
-
/*
* Calculate required number of workarea bytes needed:
* executable encryption area size:
@@ -359,7 +351,7 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
* pagetable structures for the encryption of the kernel
* pagetable structures for workarea (in case not currently mapped)
*/
- execute_start = workarea_start;
+ execute_start = workarea_start = (unsigned long)RIP_REL_REF(sme_workarea);
execute_end = execute_start + (PAGE_SIZE * 2) + PMD_SIZE;
execute_len = execute_end - execute_start;
@@ -502,7 +494,7 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
}
-void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
+void __head sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
{
const char *cmdline_ptr, *cmdline_arg, *cmdline_on;
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
--
2.44.0.769.g3c40516874-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-19 8:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-19 8:11 [PATCH for-stable-6.1 00/23] x86/efistub backports Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 01/23] x86/efi: Drop EFI stub .bss from .data section Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 02/23] x86/efi: Disregard setup header of loaded image Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 03/23] x86/efistub: Reinstate soft limit for initrd loading Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 04/23] x86/efi: Drop alignment flags from PE section headers Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 05/23] x86/boot: Remove the 'bugger off' message Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 06/23] x86/boot: Omit compression buffer from PE/COFF image memory footprint Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 07/23] x86/boot: Drop redundant code setting the root device Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 08/23] x86/boot: Drop references to startup_64 Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 09/23] x86/boot: Grab kernel_info offset from zoffset header directly Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 10/23] x86/boot: Set EFI handover offset directly in header asm Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 11/23] x86/boot: Define setup size in linker script Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 12/23] x86/boot: Derive file size from _edata symbol Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 13/23] x86/boot: Construct PE/COFF .text section from assembler Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 14/23] x86/boot: Drop PE/COFF .reloc section Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 15/23] x86/boot: Split off PE/COFF .data section Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 16/23] x86/boot: Increase section and file alignment to 4k/512 Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 17/23] x86/efistub: Use 1:1 file:memory mapping for PE/COFF .compat section Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 18/23] x86/mm: Remove P*D_PAGE_MASK and P*D_PAGE_SIZE macros Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 19/23] x86/head/64: Add missing __head annotation to startup_64_load_idt() Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 20/23] x86/head/64: Move the __head definition to <asm/init.h> Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 22/23] x86/sev: Move early startup code into .head.text section Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 8:11 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 23/23] x86/efistub: Remap kernel text read-only before dropping NX attribute Ard Biesheuvel
2024-04-19 10:47 ` [PATCH for-stable-6.1 00/23] x86/efistub backports Greg KH
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20240419081105.3817596-46-ardb+git@google.com \
--to=ardb+git@google.com \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.