From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D3CC6157460 for ; Wed, 24 Apr 2024 21:41:24 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1713994884; cv=none; b=jrGd1AnWKI0UwX0aqxremrTxqSqBPyO4+KFHZ2iN/72zoiuYyriNJoq7XmvK5O7fxnWdlF9mVf+KDKo9QfuxhPJtgk/9hbbBfvDipJkKekA8O4aYKZXbeMgas0C/RKbksJK3ZERHCKsyxawZgXu82CLMN1z5syZ62qkMWkJkBMs= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1713994884; c=relaxed/simple; bh=rtHre1LYY3ou8F8A6X+0N1bb2qKlkjmuFMJGWs0k+Ko=; h=Date:To:From:Subject:Message-Id; b=OEotn4QxtxJGOZrBwe4QyNxpmiWtwBtJgUCODwJYTXksAZ5HkBYxvPh+qDUACC7ZlWH/vZoSm7mB6CK19U8FudVvsEmV9fcCaF58YRW6836H41E+e46hhluM5krsNmRqTbgj08y/aE7nj3Xwk8UebMJ9uXMt6VHlO0cHQNcO+YI= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux-foundation.org header.i=@linux-foundation.org header.b=hjRr22PC; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux-foundation.org header.i=@linux-foundation.org header.b="hjRr22PC" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 50F02C113CD; Wed, 24 Apr 2024 21:41:24 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linux-foundation.org; s=korg; t=1713994884; bh=rtHre1LYY3ou8F8A6X+0N1bb2qKlkjmuFMJGWs0k+Ko=; h=Date:To:From:Subject:From; b=hjRr22PC8F5nnYIVz9T4OH+Pncp5OxFtZMU7g0J/F2/R6NoUOhY8ko2qGiDZYbHYb 6LflgzfdhxAMg1sqOAscjiJn9Tfr2LYeiLNDntNAoECmjKbgr8fntV41Qi961xTBnH 9ePRvj4zC9h3fCxsMgJxTFIDu1zur2n4PCRAMQ3w= Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2024 14:41:23 -0700 To: mm-commits@vger.kernel.org,willy@infradead.org,usama.anjum@collabora.com,torvalds@linux-foundation.org,surenb@google.com,sroettger@google.com,shuah@kernel.org,pedro.falcato@gmail.com,Liam.Howlett@oracle.com,keescook@chromium.org,jorgelo@chromium.org,jeffxu@google.com,javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com,jannh@google.com,groeck@chromium.org,gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,dave.hansen@intel.com,corbet@lwn.net,amer.shanawany@gmail.com,jeffxu@chromium.org,akpm@linux-foundation.org From: Andrew Morton Subject: + mseal-add-mseal-syscall-fix.patch added to mm-unstable branch Message-Id: <20240424214124.50F02C113CD@smtp.kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: mm-commits@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: The patch titled Subject: mseal: add branch prediction hint has been added to the -mm mm-unstable branch. Its filename is mseal-add-mseal-syscall-fix.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patches/mseal-add-mseal-syscall-fix.patch This patch will later appear in the mm-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Jeff Xu Subject: mseal: add branch prediction hint Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2024 19:28:25 +0000 It is unlikely that application calls mm syscall, such as mprotect, on already sealed mappings, adding branch prediction hint. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240423192825.1273679-2-jeffxu@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu Suggested-by: Pedro Falcato Cc: Amer Al Shanawany Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Guenter Roeck Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Javier Carrasco Cc: Jeff Xu Cc: Jonathan Corbet Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Liam R. Howlett Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum Cc: Shuah Khan Cc: Stephen Röttger Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- mm/madvise.c | 2 +- mm/mmap.c | 4 ++-- mm/mprotect.c | 2 +- mm/mremap.c | 4 ++-- mm/mseal.c | 6 +++--- 5 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) --- a/mm/madvise.c~mseal-add-mseal-syscall-fix +++ a/mm/madvise.c @@ -1436,7 +1436,7 @@ int do_madvise(struct mm_struct *mm, uns * Check if the address range is sealed for do_madvise(). * can_modify_mm_madv assumes we have acquired the lock on MM. */ - if (!can_modify_mm_madv(mm, start, end, behavior)) { + if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm_madv(mm, start, end, behavior))) { error = -EPERM; goto out; } --- a/mm/mmap.c~mseal-add-mseal-syscall-fix +++ a/mm/mmap.c @@ -2740,7 +2740,7 @@ int do_vmi_munmap(struct vma_iterator *v * Prevent unmapping a sealed VMA. * can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM. */ - if (!can_modify_mm(mm, start, end)) + if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, start, end))) return -EPERM; /* arch_unmap() might do unmaps itself. */ @@ -3163,7 +3163,7 @@ int do_vma_munmap(struct vma_iterator *v * Prevent unmapping a sealed VMA. * can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM. */ - if (!can_modify_mm(mm, start, end)) + if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, start, end))) return -EPERM; arch_unmap(mm, start, end); --- a/mm/mprotect.c~mseal-add-mseal-syscall-fix +++ a/mm/mprotect.c @@ -749,7 +749,7 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned lon * checking if memory is sealed. * can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM. */ - if (!can_modify_mm(current->mm, start, end)) { + if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(current->mm, start, end))) { error = -EPERM; goto out; } --- a/mm/mremap.c~mseal-add-mseal-syscall-fix +++ a/mm/mremap.c @@ -912,7 +912,7 @@ static unsigned long mremap_to(unsigned * * can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM. */ - if (!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len)) + if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len))) return -EPERM; if (flags & MREMAP_FIXED) { @@ -1087,7 +1087,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mremap, unsigned long, a * Place can_modify_mm here so we can keep the logic related to * shrink/expand together. */ - if (!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len)) { + if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len))) { ret = -EPERM; goto out; } --- a/mm/mseal.c~mseal-add-mseal-syscall-fix +++ a/mm/mseal.c @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static inline void set_vma_sealed(struct */ static bool can_modify_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { - if (vma_is_sealed(vma)) + if (unlikely(vma_is_sealed(vma))) return false; return true; @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ bool can_modify_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, /* going through each vma to check. */ for_each_vma_range(vmi, vma, end) { - if (!can_modify_vma(vma)) + if (unlikely(!can_modify_vma(vma))) return false; } @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ bool can_modify_mm_madv(struct mm_struct /* going through each vma to check. */ for_each_vma_range(vmi, vma, end) - if (is_ro_anon(vma) && !can_modify_vma(vma)) + if (unlikely(is_ro_anon(vma) && !can_modify_vma(vma))) return false; /* Allow by default. */ _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from jeffxu@chromium.org are mseal-wire-up-mseal-syscall.patch mseal-add-mseal-syscall.patch mseal-add-mseal-syscall-fix.patch selftest-mm-mseal-memory-sealing.patch mseal-add-documentation.patch selftest-mm-mseal-read-only-elf-memory-segment.patch selftest-mm-mseal-read-only-elf-memory-segment-fix.patch selftest-mm-mseal-read-only-elf-memory-segment-fix-3.patch