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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: CVE-2023-52734: net: sched: sch: Bounds check priority
Date: Tue, 21 May 2024 17:23:11 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2024052100-CVE-2023-52734-c8c2@gregkh> (raw)

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: sched: sch: Bounds check priority

Nothing was explicitly bounds checking the priority index used to access
clpriop[]. WARN and bail out early if it's pathological. Seen with GCC 13:

../net/sched/sch_htb.c: In function 'htb_activate_prios':
../net/sched/sch_htb.c:437:44: warning: array subscript [0, 31] is outside array bounds of 'struct htb_prio[8]' [-Warray-bounds=]
  437 |                         if (p->inner.clprio[prio].feed.rb_node)
      |                             ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~
../net/sched/sch_htb.c:131:41: note: while referencing 'clprio'
  131 |                         struct htb_prio clprio[TC_HTB_NUMPRIO];
      |                                         ^~~~~~

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2023-52734 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Fixed in 5.4.232 with commit fbe71c5dacaa
	Fixed in 5.10.169 with commit 90fcf55d83b2
	Fixed in 5.15.95 with commit 99875ea9b5b4
	Fixed in 6.1.13 with commit f6415c9c9a0b
	Fixed in 6.2 with commit de5ca4c3852f

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2023-52734
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	net/sched/sch_htb.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fbe71c5dacaa5a9960323215f118958174c81aa0
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/90fcf55d83b20da1091f926a291af05fb74f61c6
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99875ea9b5b47995bfb3c684d21eb17feb4b7e6a
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6415c9c9a0b3881543d38528a58b54af4351522
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de5ca4c3852f896cacac2bf259597aab5e17d9e3

             reply	other threads:[~2024-05-21 15:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-21 15:23 Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2024-05-28  7:53 ` CVE-2023-52734: net: sched: sch: Bounds check priority Michal Hocko
2024-05-28 19:06   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-05-29  7:30     ` Michal Hocko
2024-05-29  9:51       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-06-06  7:24         ` Michal Hocko

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