From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: CVE-2023-52732: ceph: blocklist the kclient when receiving corrupted snap trace
Date: Tue, 21 May 2024 17:23:09 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2024052159-CVE-2023-52732-c783@gregkh> (raw)
Description
===========
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: blocklist the kclient when receiving corrupted snap trace
When received corrupted snap trace we don't know what exactly has
happened in MDS side. And we shouldn't continue IOs and metadatas
access to MDS, which may corrupt or get incorrect contents.
This patch will just block all the further IO/MDS requests
immediately and then evict the kclient itself.
The reason why we still need to evict the kclient just after
blocking all the further IOs is that the MDS could revoke the caps
faster.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2023-52732 to this issue.
Affected and fixed versions
===========================
Fixed in 6.1.13 with commit 66ec619e4591
Fixed in 6.2 with commit a68e564adcaa
Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.
Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at
https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2023-52732
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.
Affected files
==============
The file(s) affected by this issue are:
fs/ceph/addr.c
fs/ceph/caps.c
fs/ceph/file.c
fs/ceph/mds_client.c
fs/ceph/snap.c
fs/ceph/super.h
Mitigation
==========
The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66ec619e4591f8350f99c5269a7ce160cccc7a7c
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a68e564adcaa69b0930809fb64d9d5f7d9c32ba9
reply other threads:[~2024-05-21 15:25 UTC|newest]
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