Re: [PATCH 4/5] vfio/type1: Flush CPU caches on DMA pages in non-coherent domains

[Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>]

On Wed, May 22, 2024 at 11:24:20AM +0800, Yan Zhao wrote:
> On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 01:34:00PM -0300, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> > On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 10:21:23AM -0600, Alex Williamson wrote:
> > 
> > > > Intel GPU weirdness should not leak into making other devices
> > > > insecure/slow. If necessary Intel GPU only should get some variant
> > > > override to keep no snoop working.
> > > > 
> > > > It would make alot of good sense if VFIO made the default to disable
> > > > no-snoop via the config space.
> > > 
> > > We can certainly virtualize the config space no-snoop enable bit, but
> > > I'm not sure what it actually accomplishes.  We'd then be relying on
> > > the device to honor the bit and not have any backdoors to twiddle the
> > > bit otherwise (where we know that GPUs often have multiple paths to get
> > > to config space).
> > 
> > I'm OK with this. If devices are insecure then they need quirks in
> > vfio to disclose their problems, we shouldn't punish everyone who
> > followed the spec because of some bad actors.
> Does that mean a malicous device that does not honor the bit could read
> uninitialized host data?

Yes, but a malicious device could also just do DMA with the PF RID and
break everything. VFIO substantially trusts the device already, I'm
not sure trusting it to do no-snoop blocking is a big reach.

Jason