From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4223C1E481 for ; Thu, 23 May 2024 12:17:36 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1716466657; cv=none; b=U8X578eHn7IgVIBlrtRJCM/wWS/pCtAYUuUx0JWucWoQAWCnU0fK1JxV+ddT4NOmiAGo+av+w4C/dQpHbgxa2RAk3oVc2wpGWA+dmoNVeBphJ1Z95yqcojc03YJoerEwrmkqFsjhR/zDkBT4Wjy63hbEvlyhueZKPxlgBYvyIB0= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1716466657; c=relaxed/simple; bh=kShS9kQyOqyj0DwymZCMdDwTAoPZdXCOAqKVdAJhs7s=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=M/FkAfoMet6LhwbTuBnbHLKE29VJmubcF+JhohIB8Xf+HJSvKXzHIYEtUEGSjGzm/d6K4bSCWCUmzezUJJmyNtz9srNkn5oyQFOnjONGYHtvmA5SIBHKTkgKOwY+0dI2/rJyfnvyFUoHhnaBLkVRXH6p3rICDHrjW+zUMJ7HMG4= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=AgdBCXcD; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="AgdBCXcD" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 49B40C2BD10; Thu, 23 May 2024 12:17:36 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1716466656; bh=kShS9kQyOqyj0DwymZCMdDwTAoPZdXCOAqKVdAJhs7s=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=AgdBCXcD0rL5hM44PRnaWIAKiTB/01ku8nPMGsVjdAf9DooW9QgEREPI0cQzJ9WmF uR1oFOjJmUbpnPcrgFD0645cjomv+s2w0oHGu2tVk5gv+sJusRv+ZHdVn16ukVpM/T /3G2F5OhW3QuHJwDQTy5olTQ/kdP4Uw2xxcoFfFM= Date: Thu, 23 May 2024 14:17:34 +0200 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: Nikolay Borisov Cc: cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: CVE-2024-35802: x86/sev: Fix position dependent variable references in startup code Message-ID: <2024052310-undermost-cramp-5d81@gregkh> References: <2024051738-CVE-2024-35802-959d@gregkh> <2024052334-cable-serotonin-fa2b@gregkh> <5ea91ae6-091d-4378-950b-833561eef48c@suse.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <5ea91ae6-091d-4378-950b-833561eef48c@suse.com> On Thu, May 23, 2024 at 03:01:56PM +0300, Nikolay Borisov wrote: > > > On 23.05.24 г. 14:21 ч., Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > Isn't crashing SEV guests a problem with "availability"? That term > > comes from the CVE definition of what we need to mark as a CVE, which is > > why this one was picked. > > But availability has never been one of the tenets of CoCo, in fact in > sev-snp/tdx the VMM is explicitly considered outside of the TCB so > availability cannot be guaranteed. This has nothing to do with CoCo (but really, ability of the host to crash the guest seems like it should be as I would assume that CoCo guests would want to be able to be run...) Official CVE definition of vulnerability from cve.org: An instance of one or more weaknesses in a Product that can be exploited, causing a negative impact to confidentiality, integrity, or availability; a set of conditions or behaviors that allows the violation of an explicit or implicit security policy. I think "able to crash SEV guests" is a direct weakness that has to do with availability here which is why I marked it as such (as did other reviewers.) Now if CoCo wants to claim it as part of their security implicit or explicit security policy, all the better :) thanks, greg k-h