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From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: mm-commits@vger.kernel.org,vbabka@suse.cz,svens@linux.ibm.com,rostedt@goodmis.org,roman.gushchin@linux.dev,rientjes@google.com,penberg@kernel.org,mhiramat@kernel.org,mark.rutland@arm.com,iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com,hca@linux.ibm.com,gor@linux.ibm.com,glider@google.com,elver@google.com,dvyukov@google.com,cl@linux.com,borntraeger@linux.ibm.com,agordeev@linux.ibm.com,42.hyeyoo@gmail.com,iii@linux.ibm.com,akpm@linux-foundation.org
Subject: + s390-traps-unpoison-the-kernel_stack_overflows-pt_regs.patch added to mm-unstable branch
Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2024 13:31:34 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240613203135.29232C2BBFC@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)


The patch titled
     Subject: s390/traps: unpoison the kernel_stack_overflow()'s pt_regs
has been added to the -mm mm-unstable branch.  Its filename is
     s390-traps-unpoison-the-kernel_stack_overflows-pt_regs.patch

This patch will shortly appear at
     https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patches/s390-traps-unpoison-the-kernel_stack_overflows-pt_regs.patch

This patch will later appear in the mm-unstable branch at
    git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm

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*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***

The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days

------------------------------------------------------
From: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: s390/traps: unpoison the kernel_stack_overflow()'s pt_regs
Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2024 17:34:33 +0200

This is normally done by the generic entry code, but the
kernel_stack_overflow() flow bypasses it.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240613153924.961511-32-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
---

 arch/s390/kernel/traps.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c~s390-traps-unpoison-the-kernel_stack_overflows-pt_regs
+++ a/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/entry-common.h>
+#include <linux/kmsan.h>
 #include <asm/asm-extable.h>
 #include <asm/vtime.h>
 #include <asm/fpu.h>
@@ -262,6 +263,11 @@ static void monitor_event_exception(stru
 
 void kernel_stack_overflow(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
+	/*
+	 * Normally regs are unpoisoned by the generic entry code, but
+	 * kernel_stack_overflow() is a rare case that is called bypassing it.
+	 */
+	kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs(regs);
 	bust_spinlocks(1);
 	printk("Kernel stack overflow.\n");
 	show_regs(regs);
_

Patches currently in -mm which might be from iii@linux.ibm.com are

ftrace-unpoison-ftrace_regs-in-ftrace_ops_list_func.patch
kmsan-make-the-tests-compatible-with-kmsanpanic=1.patch
kmsan-disable-kmsan-when-deferred_struct_page_init-is-enabled.patch
kmsan-increase-the-maximum-store-size-to-4096.patch
kmsan-fix-is_bad_asm_addr-on-arches-with-overlapping-address-spaces.patch
kmsan-fix-kmsan_copy_to_user-on-arches-with-overlapping-address-spaces.patch
kmsan-remove-a-useless-assignment-from-kmsan_vmap_pages_range_noflush.patch
kmsan-remove-an-x86-specific-include-from-kmsanh.patch
kmsan-expose-kmsan_get_metadata.patch
kmsan-export-panic_on_kmsan.patch
kmsan-allow-disabling-kmsan-checks-for-the-current-task.patch
kmsan-support-slab_poison.patch
kmsan-use-align_down-in-kmsan_get_metadata.patch
kmsan-do-not-round-up-pg_data_t-size.patch
mm-slub-let-kmsan-access-metadata.patch
mm-slub-unpoison-the-memchr_inv-return-value.patch
mm-kfence-disable-kmsan-when-checking-the-canary.patch
lib-zlib-unpoison-dfltcc-output-buffers.patch
kmsan-accept-ranges-starting-with-0-on-s390.patch
s390-boot-turn-off-kmsan.patch
s390-use-a-larger-stack-for-kmsan.patch
s390-boot-add-the-kmsan-runtime-stub.patch
s390-checksum-add-a-kmsan-check.patch
s390-cpacf-unpoison-the-results-of-cpacf_trng.patch
s390-cpumf-unpoison-stcctm-output-buffer.patch
s390-diag-unpoison-diag224-output-buffer.patch
s390-ftrace-unpoison-ftrace_regs-in-kprobe_ftrace_handler.patch
s390-irqflags-do-not-instrument-arch_local_irq_-with-kmsan.patch
s390-mm-define-kmsan-metadata-for-vmalloc-and-modules.patch
s390-string-add-kmsan-support.patch
s390-traps-unpoison-the-kernel_stack_overflows-pt_regs.patch
s390-uaccess-add-kmsan-support-to-put_user-and-get_user.patch
s390-unwind-disable-kmsan-checks.patch
s390-implement-the-architecture-specific-kmsan-functions.patch
kmsan-enable-on-s390.patch


             reply	other threads:[~2024-06-13 20:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-06-13 20:31 Andrew Morton [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2024-06-20  0:59 + s390-traps-unpoison-the-kernel_stack_overflows-pt_regs.patch added to mm-unstable branch Andrew Morton
2023-12-14 22:44 Andrew Morton

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