From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: CVE-2024-38628: usb: gadget: u_audio: Fix race condition use of controls after free during gadget unbind.
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 12:19:54 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2024062140-CVE-2024-38628-e2db@gregkh> (raw)
Description
===========
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: u_audio: Fix race condition use of controls after free during gadget unbind.
Hang on to the control IDs instead of pointers since those are correctly
handled with locks.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2024-38628 to this issue.
Affected and fixed versions
===========================
Issue introduced in 5.15 with commit 02de698ca812 and fixed in 6.1.93 with commit 89e668096844
Issue introduced in 5.15 with commit 02de698ca812 and fixed in 6.6.33 with commit 453d3fa9266e
Issue introduced in 5.15 with commit 02de698ca812 and fixed in 6.9.4 with commit bea73b58ab67
Issue introduced in 5.15 with commit 02de698ca812 and fixed in 6.10-rc1 with commit 1b739388aa3f
Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.
Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at
https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2024-38628
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.
Affected files
==============
The file(s) affected by this issue are:
drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_audio.c
Mitigation
==========
The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89e66809684485590ea0b32c3178e42cba36ac09
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/453d3fa9266e53f85377b911c19b9a4563fa88c0
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bea73b58ab67fe581037ad9cdb93c2557590c068
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1b739388aa3f8dfb63a9fca777e6dfa6912d0464
reply other threads:[~2024-06-21 10:24 UTC|newest]
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