From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Cc: cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Hamish Martin <Hamish.Martin@alliedtelesis.co.nz>,
Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>,
Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@kernel.org>,
Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Subject: Re: CVE-2024-39362: i2c: acpi: Unbind mux adapters before delete
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2024 21:16:07 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2024070209-tapping-satchel-a949@gregkh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <364518a3a279657815b631e85f3177880b42f4f7.camel@suse.de>
On Tue, Jul 02, 2024 at 07:05:19PM +0200, Jean Delvare wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> On Tue, 2024-06-25 at 16:22 +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
> >
> > i2c: acpi: Unbind mux adapters before delete
> > (...)
> >
> > The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2024-39362 to this issue.
>
> I would like to dispute this CVE. I don't quite understand how this bug
> qualifies as a security bug, considering that only root can load and
> unload overlay SSDT tables. The bug can't be triggered on purpose by a
> remote or local unprivileged user.
>
> The bug causes a warning to be dumped to the kernel log, due to trying
> to unbind a companion device which is already unbound, but as far as I
> can see, that's all. acpi_unbind_one() is a best-effort function, it
> returns 0 no matter what. kernfs_remove_by_ame_ns() will gracefully
> return an error code. I can't see any obvious use-after-free happening
> so I see no way an attacker could exploit this bug.
>
> So I would cancel this CVE.
Now rejected, thanks for the information.
thanks,
greg k-h
prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-07-02 19:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-06-25 14:22 CVE-2024-39362: i2c: acpi: Unbind mux adapters before delete Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-02 17:05 ` Jean Delvare
2024-07-02 19:16 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
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