From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
"liuyuntao (F)" <liuyuntao12@huawei.com>,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] randomize_kstack: Improve stack alignment codegen
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2024 14:16:16 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240702211612.work.576-kees@kernel.org> (raw)
The codgen for adding architecture-specific stack alignment to the
effective alloca() usage is somewhat inefficient and allows a bit to get
carried beyond the desired entropy range. This isn't really a problem,
but it's unexpected and the codegen is kind of bad.
Quoting Mark[1], the disassembly for arm64's invoke_syscall() looks like:
// offset = raw_cpu_read(kstack_offset)
mov x4, sp
adrp x0, kstack_offset
mrs x5, tpidr_el1
add x0, x0, #:lo12:kstack_offset
ldr w0, [x0, x5]
// offset = KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(offset)
and x0, x0, #0x3ff
// alloca(offset)
add x0, x0, #0xf
and x0, x0, #0x7f0
sub sp, x4, x0
... which in C would be:
offset = raw_cpu_read(kstack_offset)
offset &= 0x3ff; // [0x0, 0x3ff]
offset += 0xf; // [0xf, 0x40e]
offset &= 0x7f0; // [0x0,
... so when *all* bits [3:0] are 0, they'll have no impact, and when
*any* of bits [3:0] are 1 they'll trigger a carry into bit 4, which
could ripple all the way up and spill into bit 10.
Switch the masking in KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX() to explicitly clear the bottom
bits to avoid the rounding by using 0b1111110000 instead of 0b1111111111:
// offset = raw_cpu_read(kstack_offset)
mov x4, sp
adrp x0, 0 <kstack_offset>
mrs x5, tpidr_el1
add x0, x0, #:lo12:kstack_offset
ldr w0, [x0, x5]
// offset = KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(offset)
and x0, x0, #0x3f0
// alloca(offset)
sub sp, x4, x0
Suggested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZnVfOnIuFl2kNWkT@J2N7QTR9R3/ [1]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: "liuyuntao (F)" <liuyuntao12@huawei.com>
Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
---
include/linux/randomize_kstack.h | 18 ++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
index 6d92b68efbf6..1d982dbdd0d0 100644
--- a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
+++ b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
@@ -32,13 +32,19 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset);
#endif
/*
- * Use, at most, 10 bits of entropy. We explicitly cap this to keep the
- * "VLA" from being unbounded (see above). 10 bits leaves enough room for
- * per-arch offset masks to reduce entropy (by removing higher bits, since
- * high entropy may overly constrain usable stack space), and for
- * compiler/arch-specific stack alignment to remove the lower bits.
+ * Use, at most, 6 bits of entropy (on 64-bit; 8 on 32-bit). This cap is
+ * to keep the "VLA" from being unbounded (see above). Additionally clear
+ * the bottom 4 bits (on 64-bit systems, 2 for 32-bit), since stack
+ * alignment will always be at least word size. This makes the compiler
+ * code gen better when it is applying the actual per-arch alignment to
+ * the final offset. The resulting randomness is reasonable without overly
+ * constraining usable stack space.
*/
-#define KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(x) ((x) & 0x3FF)
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+#define KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(x) ((x) & 0b1111110000)
+#else
+#define KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(x) ((x) & 0b1111111100)
+#endif
/**
* add_random_kstack_offset - Increase stack utilization by previously
--
2.34.1
reply other threads:[~2024-07-02 21:16 UTC|newest]
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