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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@collabora.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel@collabora.com, gbiv@google.com, inglorion@google.com,
	ajordanr@google.com, Doug Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>,
	Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] proc: add config to block FOLL_FORCE in mem writes
Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2024 13:53:35 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240717205335.GA3632@sol.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240717111358.415712-1-adrian.ratiu@collabora.com>

On Wed, Jul 17, 2024 at 02:13:58PM +0300, Adrian Ratiu wrote:
> +config SECURITY_PROC_MEM_RESTRICT_FOLL_FORCE
> +	bool "Remove FOLL_FORCE usage from /proc/pid/mem writes"
> +	default n
> +	help
> +	  This restricts FOLL_FORCE flag usage in procfs mem write calls
> +	  because it bypasses memory permission checks and can be used by
> +	  attackers to manipulate process memory contents that would be
> +	  otherwise protected.
> +
> +	  Enabling this will break GDB, gdbserver and other debuggers
> +	  which require FOLL_FORCE for basic functionalities.
> +
> +	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

FOLL_FORCE is an internal flag, and people who aren't kernel developers aren't
going to know what it is.  Could this option be named and documented in a way
that would be more understandable to people who aren't kernel developers?  What
is the effect on how /proc/pid/mem behaves?

- Eric

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-07-17 20:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-07-17 11:13 [PATCH] proc: add config to block FOLL_FORCE in mem writes Adrian Ratiu
2024-07-17 17:22 ` Kees Cook
2024-07-17 18:16   ` Linus Torvalds
2024-07-17 22:23     ` Kees Cook
2024-07-18  0:04       ` Linus Torvalds
2024-07-18 15:58         ` Adrian Ratiu
2024-07-17 20:53 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2024-07-17 21:28   ` Kees Cook

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