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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com,
	snitzer@kernel.org, mpatocka@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com,
	paul@paul-moore.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, fsverity@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev,
	audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v20 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs
Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2024 11:51:32 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240805185132.GC1564@sol.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1722665314-21156-16-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com>

On Fri, Aug 02, 2024 at 11:08:29PM -0700, Fan Wu wrote:
> This patch enhances fsverity's capabilities to support both integrity and
> authenticity protection by introducing the exposure of built-in
> signatures through a new LSM hook. This functionality allows LSMs,
> e.g. IPE, to enforce policies based on the authenticity and integrity of
> files, specifically focusing on built-in fsverity signatures. It enables
> a policy enforcement layer within LSMs for fsverity, offering granular
> control over the usage of authenticity claims. For instance, a policy
> could be established to only permit the execution of all files with
> verified built-in fsverity signatures.
> 
> The introduction of a security_inode_setintegrity() hook call within
> fsverity's workflow ensures that the verified built-in signature of a file
> is exposed to LSMs. This enables LSMs to recognize and label fsverity files
> that contain a verified built-in fsverity signature. This hook is invoked
> subsequent to the fsverity_verify_signature() process, guaranteeing the
> signature's verification against fsverity's keyring. This mechanism is
> crucial for maintaining system security, as it operates in kernel space,
> effectively thwarting attempts by malicious binaries to bypass user space
> stack interactions.
> 
> The second to last commit in this patch set will add a link to the IPE
> documentation in fsverity.rst.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>

Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

- Eric

  reply	other threads:[~2024-08-05 18:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-08-03  6:08 [PATCH v20 00/20] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 01/20] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 02/20] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2024-08-10 15:50   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-08-13 17:54     ` Fan Wu
2024-08-14  1:53       ` Paul Moore
2024-08-14 18:23         ` Fan Wu
2024-08-15 19:11           ` Paul Moore
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 03/20] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2024-08-10 20:05   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 04/20] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 05/20] initramfs|security: Add a security hook to do_populate_rootfs() Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 06/20] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 07/20] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 08/20] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 09/20] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 10/20] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 11/20] block|lsm: Add LSM blob and new LSM hooks for block devices Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs Fan Wu
2024-08-08 22:38   ` Fan Wu
2024-08-15 19:19     ` Paul Moore
2024-08-16 13:35       ` Mikulas Patocka
2024-08-16 19:11         ` Fan Wu
2024-08-18 17:22           ` Paul Moore
2024-08-19 17:47             ` Fan Wu
2024-08-19 19:40               ` Paul Moore
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 13/20] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 14/20] security: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs Fan Wu
2024-08-05 18:51   ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 16/20] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 17/20] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 18/20] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 19/20] Documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 20/20] MAINTAINERS: ipe: add ipe maintainer information Fan Wu
2024-08-03  8:14   ` Paul Menzel
2024-08-06 20:54     ` Paul Moore
2024-08-07  4:48       ` Paul Menzel
2024-08-07 18:01         ` Fan Wu
2024-08-07 19:42           ` Paul Moore
2024-08-06 20:59 ` [PATCH v20 00/20] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Paul Moore
2024-08-20  2:51   ` Paul Moore

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