From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, jack@suse.cz,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
josef@toxicpanda.com, wojciech.gladysz@infogain.com,
ebiederm@xmission.com, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] exec: drop a racy path_noexec check
Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2024 14:06:12 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202408071404.4A44CFFF@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240806-atmen-planen-f0eb6e830d8e@brauner>
On Tue, Aug 06, 2024 at 09:06:17AM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Mon, 05 Aug 2024 15:17:21 +0200, Mateusz Guzik wrote:
> > Both i_mode and noexec checks wrapped in WARN_ON stem from an artifact
> > of the previous implementation. They used to legitimately check for the
> > condition, but that got moved up in two commits:
> > 633fb6ac3980 ("exec: move S_ISREG() check earlier")
> > 0fd338b2d2cd ("exec: move path_noexec() check earlier")
> >
> > Instead of being removed said checks are WARN_ON'ed instead, which
> > has some debug value
> >
> > [...]
>
> Applied to the vfs.misc branch of the vfs/vfs.git tree.
NAK, please drop this patch. I want to keep the "redundant"
path_noexec(), since it still provides meaningful signal. We can remove
it from the WARN_ON_ONCE(), but I don't want to drop it.
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-07 21:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-01 12:07 [PATCH] kernel/fs: last check for exec credentials on NOEXEC mount Wojciech Gładysz
2024-08-01 14:07 ` Josef Bacik
2024-08-01 15:15 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-08-02 15:58 ` Josef Bacik
2024-08-03 6:29 ` Mateusz Guzik
2024-08-05 9:26 ` Christian Brauner
2024-08-05 13:17 ` [PATCH] exec: drop a racy path_noexec check Mateusz Guzik
2024-08-05 15:35 ` Christian Brauner
2024-08-05 20:21 ` Kees Cook
2024-08-05 23:38 ` Al Viro
2024-08-05 23:41 ` Al Viro
2024-08-06 7:06 ` Christian Brauner
2024-08-07 21:06 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2024-08-02 3:28 ` [PATCH] kernel/fs: last check for exec credentials on NOEXEC mount Kees Cook
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