From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: "Rick P. Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>,
Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>,
Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
jannh@google.com, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFT v8 0/9] fork: Support shadow stacks in clone3()
Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2024 10:54:31 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202408081053.0EABACA@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240808-clone3-shadow-stack-v8-0-0acf37caf14c@kernel.org>
On Thu, Aug 08, 2024 at 09:15:21AM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
> The kernel has recently added support for shadow stacks, currently
> x86 only using their CET feature but both arm64 and RISC-V have
> equivalent features (GCS and Zicfiss respectively), I am actively
> working on GCS[1]. With shadow stacks the hardware maintains an
> additional stack containing only the return addresses for branch
> instructions which is not generally writeable by userspace and ensures
> that any returns are to the recorded addresses. This provides some
> protection against ROP attacks and making it easier to collect call
> stacks. These shadow stacks are allocated in the address space of the
> userspace process.
>
> Our API for shadow stacks does not currently offer userspace any
> flexiblity for managing the allocation of shadow stacks for newly
> created threads, instead the kernel allocates a new shadow stack with
> the same size as the normal stack whenever a thread is created with the
> feature enabled. The stacks allocated in this way are freed by the
> kernel when the thread exits or shadow stacks are disabled for the
> thread. This lack of flexibility and control isn't ideal, in the vast
> majority of cases the shadow stack will be over allocated and the
> implicit allocation and deallocation is not consistent with other
> interfaces. As far as I can tell the interface is done in this manner
> mainly because the shadow stack patches were in development since before
> clone3() was implemented.
>
> Since clone3() is readily extensible let's add support for specifying a
> shadow stack when creating a new thread or process in a similar manner
> to how the normal stack is specified, keeping the current implicit
> allocation behaviour if one is not specified either with clone3() or
> through the use of clone(). The user must provide a shadow stack
> address and size, this must point to memory mapped for use as a shadow
> stackby map_shadow_stack() with a shadow stack token at the top of the
> stack.
>
> Please note that the x86 portions of this code are build tested only, I
> don't appear to have a system that can run CET avaible to me, I have
> done testing with an integration into my pending work for GCS. There is
> some possibility that the arm64 implementation may require the use of
> clone3() and explicit userspace allocation of shadow stacks, this is
> still under discussion.
>
> Please further note that the token consumption done by clone3() is not
> currently implemented in an atomic fashion, Rick indicated that he would
> look into fixing this if people are OK with the implementation.
>
> A new architecture feature Kconfig option for shadow stacks is added as
> here, this was suggested as part of the review comments for the arm64
> GCS series and since we need to detect if shadow stacks are supported it
> seemed sensible to roll it in here.
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231009-arm64-gcs-v6-0-78e55deaa4dd@kernel.org/
>
> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
(Testing was done on CET hardware.)
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-08 17:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-08 8:15 [PATCH RFT v8 0/9] fork: Support shadow stacks in clone3() Mark Brown
2024-08-08 8:15 ` [PATCH RFT v8 1/9] Documentation: userspace-api: Add shadow stack API documentation Mark Brown
2024-08-14 10:40 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-08 8:15 ` [PATCH RFT v8 2/9] selftests: Provide helper header for shadow stack testing Mark Brown
2024-08-08 8:15 ` [PATCH RFT v8 3/9] mm: Introduce ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK Mark Brown
2024-08-14 10:41 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-08 8:15 ` [PATCH RFT v8 4/9] fork: Add shadow stack support to clone3() Mark Brown
2024-08-09 18:19 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-09 23:06 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-13 16:25 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-13 18:58 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-14 9:38 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-14 13:20 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-15 0:18 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-08-15 14:24 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-16 8:44 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-16 10:51 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-16 15:29 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-16 15:46 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-16 14:52 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-08-16 15:30 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-16 15:38 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-16 17:06 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-16 17:08 ` Jann Horn
2024-08-16 17:17 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-08 8:15 ` [PATCH RFT v8 5/9] selftests/clone3: Remove redundant flushes of output streams Mark Brown
2024-08-08 8:15 ` [PATCH RFT v8 6/9] selftests/clone3: Factor more of main loop into test_clone3() Mark Brown
2024-08-08 8:15 ` [PATCH RFT v8 7/9] selftests/clone3: Explicitly handle child exits due to signals Mark Brown
2024-08-08 8:15 ` [PATCH RFT v8 8/9] selftests/clone3: Allow tests to flag if -E2BIG is a valid error code Mark Brown
2024-08-08 8:15 ` [PATCH RFT v8 9/9] selftests/clone3: Test shadow stack support Mark Brown
2024-08-08 17:54 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2024-08-15 0:19 ` [PATCH RFT v8 0/9] fork: Support shadow stacks in clone3() Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-08-16 15:52 ` Jann Horn
2024-08-16 16:19 ` Mark Brown
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