[PATCH v3 2/4] xen: make VMAP only support in MMU system

[Ayan Kumar Halder <ayan.kumar.halder@amd.com>]

From: Penny Zheng <penny.zheng@arm.com>

Introduced CONFIG_VMAP which is selected by the architectures that use
MMU. vm_init() does not do anything if CONFIG_VMAP is not enabled.

VMAP is widely used in ALTERNATIVE feature to remap a range of memory
with new memory attributes. Since this is highly dependent on virtual
address translation, we choose to fold VMAP in MMU system.

In this patch, we introduce a new Kconfig CONFIG_HAS_VMAP, and make it
only support in MMU system on ARM architecture. And ALTERNATIVE now
depends on VMAP.

HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR is now gated on HAS_VMAP as speculative
attacks are not possible on non MMU based systems (ie Cortex-R52, R82).
See https://developer.arm.com/Arm%20Security%20Center/Speculative%20Processor%20Vulnerability.

Signed-off-by: Penny Zheng <penny.zheng@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Chen <wei.chen@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ayan Kumar Halder <ayan.kumar.halder@amd.com>
---
Changes from :-

v1 - 1. HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR is now gated on HAS_VMAP.
2. cpuerrata.c is not gated on HAS_VMAP.

v2 - 1. Introduced CONFIG_VMAP in common/Kconfig.
2. Architectures using MMU select this config.
3. vm_init() now uses CONFIG_VMAP.

 xen/arch/arm/Kconfig   | 4 +++-
 xen/arch/arm/setup.c   | 2 ++
 xen/arch/x86/Kconfig   | 2 ++
 xen/common/Kconfig     | 3 +++
 xen/include/xen/vmap.h | 2 ++
 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/Kconfig b/xen/arch/arm/Kconfig
index 21d03d9f44..e30a7da186 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/Kconfig
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ config ARM_64
 config ARM
 	def_bool y
 	select FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_4B
-	select HAS_ALTERNATIVE
+	select HAS_ALTERNATIVE if HAS_VMAP
 	select HAS_DEVICE_TREE
 	select HAS_PASSTHROUGH
 	select HAS_UBSAN
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ config PADDR_BITS
 config MMU
 	def_bool y
 	select HAS_PMAP
+	select HAS_VMAP
 
 source "arch/Kconfig"
 
@@ -171,6 +172,7 @@ config ARM_SSBD
 
 config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 	bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT
+	depends on HAS_VMAP
 	default y
 	help
 	  Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely on
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/setup.c b/xen/arch/arm/setup.c
index cb2c0a16b8..7f686d2cca 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/setup.c
@@ -447,7 +447,9 @@ void asmlinkage __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset,
      * It needs to be called after do_initcalls to be able to use
      * stop_machine (tasklets initialized via an initcall).
      */
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_ALTERNATIVE
     apply_alternatives_all();
+#endif
     enable_errata_workarounds();
     enable_cpu_features();
 
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/Kconfig b/xen/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 7ef5c8bc48..32be057978 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 config X86_64
 	def_bool y
 	select 64BIT
+	select HAS_VMAP
 
 config X86
 	def_bool y
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ config X86
 	select HAS_UBSAN
 	select HAS_VPCI if HVM
 	select NEEDS_LIBELF
+	select HAS_VMAP
 
 config ARCH_DEFCONFIG
 	string
diff --git a/xen/common/Kconfig b/xen/common/Kconfig
index 565ceda741..188918ec5c 100644
--- a/xen/common/Kconfig
+++ b/xen/common/Kconfig
@@ -77,6 +77,9 @@ config HAS_PIRQ
 config HAS_PMAP
 	bool
 
+config HAS_VMAP
+	bool
+
 config HAS_SCHED_GRANULARITY
 	bool
 
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/vmap.h b/xen/include/xen/vmap.h
index fdae37e950..c1dd7ac22f 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/vmap.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/vmap.h
@@ -141,7 +141,9 @@ void *arch_vmap_virt_end(void);
 /* Initialises the VMAP_DEFAULT virtual range */
 static inline void vm_init(void)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_VMAP
     vm_init_type(VMAP_DEFAULT, (void *)VMAP_VIRT_START, arch_vmap_virt_end());
+#endif
 }
 
 #endif /* __XEN_VMAP_H__ */
-- 
2.25.1