All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
To: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	bp@alien8.de, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev, mingo@redhat.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	pgonda@google.com, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	nikunj@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 07/19] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2024 15:42:30 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202410171505.gZbmXuo2-lkp@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241009092850.197575-8-nikunj@amd.com>

Hi Nikunj,

kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:

[auto build test WARNING on 8cf0b93919e13d1e8d4466eb4080a4c4d9d66d7b]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Nikunj-A-Dadhania/virt-sev-guest-Use-AES-GCM-crypto-library/20241009-173734
base:   8cf0b93919e13d1e8d4466eb4080a4c4d9d66d7b
patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009092850.197575-8-nikunj%40amd.com
patch subject: [PATCH v12 07/19] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines
config: x86_64-randconfig-121-20241017 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20241017/202410171505.gZbmXuo2-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-12 (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20241017/202410171505.gZbmXuo2-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)

If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202410171505.gZbmXuo2-lkp@intel.com/

sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
>> arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c:2663:24: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) @@     expected struct snp_secrets_page *secrets @@     got void [noderef] __iomem * @@
   arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c:2663:24: sparse:     expected struct snp_secrets_page *secrets
   arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c:2663:24: sparse:     got void [noderef] __iomem *
>> arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c:2694:22: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@     expected void volatile [noderef] __iomem *addr @@     got struct snp_secrets_page *secrets @@
   arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c:2694:22: sparse:     expected void volatile [noderef] __iomem *addr
   arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c:2694:22: sparse:     got struct snp_secrets_page *secrets

vim +2663 arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c

  2649	
  2650	struct snp_msg_desc *snp_msg_alloc(void)
  2651	{
  2652		struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc;
  2653	
  2654		BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg) > PAGE_SIZE);
  2655	
  2656		if (snp_mdesc)
  2657			return snp_mdesc;
  2658	
  2659		mdesc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct snp_msg_desc), GFP_KERNEL);
  2660		if (!mdesc)
  2661			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
  2662	
> 2663		mdesc->secrets = ioremap_encrypted(secrets_pa, PAGE_SIZE);
  2664		if (!mdesc->secrets)
  2665			return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
  2666	
  2667		/* Allocate the shared page used for the request and response message. */
  2668		mdesc->request = alloc_shared_pages(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
  2669		if (!mdesc->request)
  2670			goto e_unmap;
  2671	
  2672		mdesc->response = alloc_shared_pages(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
  2673		if (!mdesc->response)
  2674			goto e_free_request;
  2675	
  2676		mdesc->certs_data = alloc_shared_pages(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE);
  2677		if (!mdesc->certs_data)
  2678			goto e_free_response;
  2679	
  2680		/* initial the input address for guest request */
  2681		mdesc->input.req_gpa = __pa(mdesc->request);
  2682		mdesc->input.resp_gpa = __pa(mdesc->response);
  2683		mdesc->input.data_gpa = __pa(mdesc->certs_data);
  2684	
  2685		snp_mdesc = mdesc;
  2686	
  2687		return mdesc;
  2688	
  2689	e_free_response:
  2690		free_shared_pages(mdesc->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
  2691	e_free_request:
  2692		free_shared_pages(mdesc->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
  2693	e_unmap:
> 2694		iounmap(mdesc->secrets);

-- 
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

  reply	other threads:[~2024-10-17  7:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-09  9:28 [PATCH v12 00/19] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 01/19] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-17 11:56   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 02/19] x86/sev: Handle failures from snp_init() Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-16 16:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-17 11:56   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 03/19] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-17 11:56   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 04/19] virt: sev-guest: Consolidate SNP guest messaging parameters to a struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-17 11:56   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 05/19] virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command mutex Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 18:32   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-17 11:56   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 06/19] virt: sev-guest: Carve out SNP message context structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-17 11:56   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 07/19] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-17  7:42   ` kernel test robot [this message]
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 08/19] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 09/19] x86/cc: Add CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 18:34   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 10/19] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 11/19] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 12/19] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 13/19] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 14/19] tsc: Use the GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR for discovering TSC frequency Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 19:39   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-14  3:36     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 15/19] tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 16:16   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-10  6:44     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 16/19] x86/kvmclock: Use clock source callback to update kvm sched clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 15:58   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-10 10:14     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-16  8:26       ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 17/19] x86/kvmclock: Abort SecureTSC enabled guest when kvmclock is selected Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 19:49   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-14  3:37     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 18/19] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 19/19] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 16:08 ` [PATCH v12 00/19] Add Secure TSC support " Dave Hansen
2024-10-10  6:28   ` Nikunj A. Dadhania

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=202410171505.gZbmXuo2-lkp@intel.com \
    --to=lkp@intel.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=nikunj@amd.com \
    --cc=oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=pgonda@google.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.