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From: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
To: mhklinux@outlook.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com,
	sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com,
	kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, wei.liu@kernel.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 6.1] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Leak pages if set_memory_encrypted() fails
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2024 10:10:44 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241031021044.1838730-1-xiangyu.chen@windriver.com> (raw)

From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit 03f5a999adba062456c8c818a683beb1b498983a ]

In CoCo VMs it is possible for the untrusted host to cause
set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an
error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to
take care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared)
memory to the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security
issues.

VMBus code could free decrypted pages if set_memory_encrypted()/decrypted()
fails. Leak the pages if this happens.

Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240311161558.1310-2-mhklinux@outlook.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Message-ID: <20240311161558.1310-2-mhklinux@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[Xiangyu: bp to fix CVE-2024-36913, resolved minor conflicts]
Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
---
 drivers/hv/connection.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/hv/connection.c b/drivers/hv/connection.c
index da51b50787df..23fb0df9d350 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/connection.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/connection.c
@@ -243,8 +243,17 @@ int vmbus_connect(void)
 		ret |= set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)
 					    vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1],
 					    1);
-		if (ret)
+		if (ret) {
+			/*
+			 * If set_memory_decrypted() fails, the encryption state
+			 * of the memory is unknown. So leak the memory instead
+			 * of risking returning decrypted memory to the free list.
+			 * For simplicity, always handle both pages the same.
+			 */
+			vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0] = NULL;
+			vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1] = NULL;
 			goto cleanup;
+		}
 
 		/*
 		 * Isolation VM with AMD SNP needs to access monitor page via
@@ -377,30 +386,39 @@ void vmbus_disconnect(void)
 	}
 
 	if (hv_is_isolation_supported()) {
-		/*
-		 * memunmap() checks input address is ioremap address or not
-		 * inside. It doesn't unmap any thing in the non-SNP CVM and
-		 * so not check CVM type here.
-		 */
-		memunmap(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0]);
-		memunmap(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1]);
-
-		set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)
-			vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[0],
-			1);
-		set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)
-			vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[1],
-			1);
-	}
+		if(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0]) {
+			/*
+			 * memunmap() checks input address is ioremap address or not
+			 * inside. It doesn't unmap any thing in the non-SNP CVM and
+			 * so not check CVM type here.
+			 */
+			memunmap(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0]);
+			if (!set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)
+				vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[0], 1))
+				hv_free_hyperv_page((unsigned long)vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0]);
+			vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[0] =
+				vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0] = NULL;
+		}
+
+		if(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1]) {
+			memunmap(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1]);
+			if (!set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)
+				vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[1], 1))
+				hv_free_hyperv_page((unsigned long)vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1]);
+			vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[1] =
+				vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1] = NULL;
+		}
+	} else {
 
-	hv_free_hyperv_page((unsigned long)
-		vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[0]);
-	hv_free_hyperv_page((unsigned long)
-		vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[1]);
-	vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[0] =
-		vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0] = NULL;
-	vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[1] =
-		vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1] = NULL;
+		hv_free_hyperv_page((unsigned long)
+			vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[0]);
+		hv_free_hyperv_page((unsigned long)
+			vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[1]);
+		vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[0] =
+			vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0] = NULL;
+		vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[1] =
+			vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1] = NULL;
+	}
 }
 
 /*
-- 
2.43.0


             reply	other threads:[~2024-10-31  2:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-31  2:10 Xiangyu Chen [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2024-10-09  8:16 [PATCH 6.1] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Leak pages if set_memory_encrypted() fails Xiangyu Chen
2024-10-09 13:33 ` Greg KH
2024-10-10  2:53   ` Xiangyu Chen

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