From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
alyssa.milburn@intel.com, scott.d.constable@intel.com,
joao@overdrivepizza.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
jpoimboe@kernel.org, alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com,
ebiggers@kernel.org, samitolvanen@google.com, kees@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/8] x86,kcfi: Fix EXPORT_SYMBOL vs kCFI
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2024 17:11:04 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241105161104.GK10375@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241105154740.GJ10375@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net>
On Tue, Nov 05, 2024 at 04:47:40PM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 05, 2024 at 07:41:13AM -0800, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> > On Tue, Nov 05, 2024 at 03:58:42PM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > > > bounded number of functions that are used as either default methods
> > > > or as ready made callbacks. Everything else has no business being
> > > > called indirectly. While disallowing this might be a bit of work,
> > > > I think it would be a great security improvement.
> > >
> > > Well, we don't disagree. But since most of the EXPORT'ed functions are
> > > done in C, we need something that works there too.
> >
> > Yes, absolutely. In fact I doubt there are more than a handful of
> > assembly exports that are valid targets for indirect calls.
>
> Yeah, I went overboard here. Let me tone it down a little.
OK, I removed a ton of them and fixed the build fallout. I've pushed it
out to the git tree mentioned somewhere, and will re-post in a few days.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-11-05 16:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-05 11:39 [PATCH 0/8] x86: kCFI and IBT cleanups Peter Zijlstra
2024-11-05 11:39 ` [PATCH 1/8] x86,kcfi: Fix EXPORT_SYMBOL vs kCFI Peter Zijlstra
2024-11-05 14:16 ` Christoph Hellwig
2024-11-05 14:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-11-05 14:32 ` Christoph Hellwig
2024-11-05 14:58 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-11-05 15:41 ` Christoph Hellwig
2024-11-05 15:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-11-05 16:11 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2024-11-09 9:14 ` David Laight
2024-11-05 11:39 ` [PATCH 2/8] x86/cfi: Clean up linkage Peter Zijlstra
2024-11-05 11:39 ` [PATCH 3/8] x86/boot: Mark start_secondary() with __noendbr Peter Zijlstra
2024-11-05 11:39 ` [PATCH 4/8] x86/alternative: Simplify callthunk patching Peter Zijlstra
2024-11-05 11:39 ` [PATCH 5/8] x86/traps: Cleanup and robustify decode_bug() Peter Zijlstra
2024-11-05 15:19 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-11-05 11:39 ` [PATCH 6/8] x86/ibt: Clean up is_endbr() Peter Zijlstra
2024-11-05 11:39 ` [PATCH 7/8] x86/ibt: Clean up poison_endbr() Peter Zijlstra
2024-11-05 11:39 ` [PATCH 8/8] x86/early_printk: Harden early_serial Peter Zijlstra
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