From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 10/35] x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2024 15:54:30 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241105215455.359471-11-david.kaplan@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241105215455.359471-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>
Restructure gds mitigation to use select/apply functions to create
consistent vulnerability handling.
Define new AUTO mitigation for gds.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 452aa5994aac..37056bdd3a9b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ static void __init srbds_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init gds_apply_mitigation(void);
/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
mmio_apply_mitigation();
rfds_apply_mitigation();
srbds_apply_mitigation();
+ gds_apply_mitigation();
}
/*
@@ -801,6 +803,7 @@ early_param("l1d_flush", l1d_flush_parse_cmdline);
enum gds_mitigations {
GDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ GDS_MITIGATION_AUTO,
GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE,
GDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
@@ -809,7 +812,7 @@ enum gds_mitigations {
};
static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS) ? GDS_MITIGATION_FULL : GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS) ? GDS_MITIGATION_AUTO : GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
static const char * const gds_strings[] = {
[GDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
@@ -850,6 +853,7 @@ void update_gds_msr(void)
case GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE:
case GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
case GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR:
+ case GDS_MITIGATION_AUTO:
return;
}
@@ -873,13 +877,16 @@ static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void)
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
- goto out;
+ return;
}
if (cpu_mitigations_off())
gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
/* Will verify below that mitigation _can_ be disabled */
+ if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_AUTO)
+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
/* No microcode */
if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) {
if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) {
@@ -892,7 +899,7 @@ static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void)
} else {
gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
}
- goto out;
+ return;
}
/* Microcode has mitigation, use it */
@@ -914,8 +921,14 @@ static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void)
gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED;
}
+}
+
+static void __init gds_apply_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS))
+ return;
+
update_gds_msr();
-out:
pr_info("%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]);
}
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-11-05 21:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-05 21:54 [PATCH v2 00/35] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 01/35] x86/bugs: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2_USER David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 02/35] x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 03/35] x86/bugs: Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds David Kaplan
2024-11-14 2:26 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 14:59 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-14 17:14 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 17:17 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 04/35] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 3:03 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 15:01 ` Kaplan, David
2024-12-10 15:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 05/35] x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 4:43 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 15:08 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 06/35] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 5:03 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 07/35] x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 5:55 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 08/35] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 09/35] x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` David Kaplan [this message]
2024-11-14 6:21 ` [PATCH v2 10/35] x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation Pawan Gupta
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 11/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 6:57 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 15:36 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-14 15:49 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-14 16:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-14 16:45 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-14 23:33 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-12 10:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-14 17:41 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 17:48 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 12/35] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 13/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-06 18:56 ` kernel test robot
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 14/35] x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 15/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 16/35] x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 17/35] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 18/35] x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation David Kaplan
2025-01-02 14:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 19/35] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-11-06 10:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-06 14:49 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-13 3:58 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-11-13 14:15 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-13 15:05 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-13 15:31 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-13 16:00 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-13 16:19 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-14 9:32 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-22 16:15 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-11-22 16:36 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-22 17:23 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-20 0:14 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-11-13 14:49 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-13 14:15 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-13 15:42 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 20/35] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-01-03 15:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-03 15:29 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-03 15:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 21/35] x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 22/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 23/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 24/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 25/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 26/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 27/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 28/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 29/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 30/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 31/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 32/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 33/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 34/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 35/35] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti David Kaplan
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