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From: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>, Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: ext4: possible circular locking dependency at ext4_xattr_inode_create
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2024 16:34:21 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241112073421.GD1458936@google.com> (raw)

Hi,

I've a following syzkaller report (no reproducer); the report is
against 5.15, but the same call-chain seems possible in current
upstream as well.  So I suspect that maybe ext4_xattr_inode_create()
should take nested inode_lock (I_MUTEX_XATTR) instead.  Does the
patch below make any sense?

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.15.168-syzkaller-23766-g3f37c55c6291 #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor297/1452 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888120b5e750 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#8/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock
ffff888120b5e750 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#8/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ext4_xattr_inode_create
ffff888120b5e750 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#8/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ext4_xattr_inode_lookup_create
ffff888120b5e750 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#8/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x2aeb/0x3200

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888120b58c68 (&ei->i_data_sem/3){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_setattr+0x12b5/0x1950

which lock already depends on the new lock.


the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (&ei->i_data_sem/3){++++}-{3:3}:
       down_write+0x38/0x60
       ext4_update_i_disksize
       ext4_xattr_inode_write
       ext4_xattr_inode_lookup_create
       ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x2839/0x3200
       ext4_xattr_ibody_set+0x113/0x320
       ext4_xattr_set_handle+0xa31/0x1440
       ext4_xattr_set+0x266/0x3d0
       __vfs_setxattr+0x15e/0x1c0
       __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x128/0x5e0
       vfs_setxattr+0x1c6/0x410
       setxattr+0x1d6/0x270
       path_setxattr+0x1cc/0x2b0
       __do_sys_lsetxattr
       __se_sys_lsetxattr
       __x64_sys_lsetxattr+0xb4/0xd0
       do_syscall_x64
       do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x66/0xd0

-> #0 (&ea_inode->i_rwsem#8/1){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       check_prev_add
       check_prevs_add
       validate_chain
       __lock_acquire+0x2c95/0x7850
       lock_acquire+0x1d2/0x4e0
       down_write+0x38/0x60
       inode_lock
       ext4_xattr_inode_create
       ext4_xattr_inode_lookup_create
       ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x2aeb/0x3200
       ext4_xattr_block_set+0xdc1/0x2de0
       ext4_xattr_move_to_block
       ext4_xattr_make_inode_space
       ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0xe58/0x19c0
       __ext4_expand_extra_isize+0x2fd/0x400
       ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize
       __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x58b/0x840
       ext4_setattr+0x1341/0x1950
       notify_change+0xafb/0xd80
       do_truncate+0x218/0x2f0
       handle_truncate
       do_open
       path_openat+0x27d3/0x2e10
       do_filp_open+0x23a/0x360
       do_sys_openat2+0x188/0x720
       do_sys_open+0x1d1/0x220
       do_syscall_x64
       do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x66/0xd0

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&ei->i_data_sem/3);
                               lock(&ea_inode->i_rwsem#8/1);
                               lock(&ei->i_data_sem/3);
  lock(&ea_inode->i_rwsem#8/1);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

5 locks held by syz-executor297/1452:
 #0: ffff88811231c460 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x3b/0x80
 #1: ffff888120b58de0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){++++}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock
 #1: ffff888120b58de0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){++++}-{3:3}, at: do_truncate+0x204/0x2f0
 #2: ffff888120b58f80 (mapping.invalidate_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: filemap_invalidate_lock
 #2: ffff888120b58f80 (mapping.invalidate_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_setattr+0xd49/0x1950
 #3: ffff888120b58c68 (&ei->i_data_sem/3){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_setattr+0x12b5/0x1950
 #4: ffff888120b58ab8 (&ei->xattr_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_write_trylock_xattr
 #4: ffff888120b58ab8 (&ei->xattr_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize
 #4: ffff888120b58ab8 (&ei->xattr_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x4f7/0x840

stack backtrace:
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack
 dump_stack_lvl+0x1e3/0x2d0
 check_noncircular+0x2f3/0x3a0
 check_prev_add
 check_prevs_add
 validate_chain
 __lock_acquire+0x2c95/0x7850
 lock_acquire+0x1d2/0x4e0
 down_write+0x38/0x60
 inode_lock
 ext4_xattr_inode_create
 ext4_xattr_inode_lookup_create
 ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x2aeb/0x3200
 ext4_xattr_block_set+0xdc1/0x2de0
 ext4_xattr_move_to_block
 ext4_xattr_make_inode_space
 ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0xe58/0x19c0
 __ext4_expand_extra_isize+0x2fd/0x400
 ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize
 __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x58b/0x840
 ext4_setattr+0x1341/0x1950
 notify_change+0xafb/0xd80
 do_truncate+0x218/0x2f0
 handle_truncate
 do_open
 path_openat+0x27d3/0x2e10
 do_filp_open+0x23a/0x360
 do_sys_openat2+0x188/0x720
 do_sys_open+0x1d1/0x220
 do_syscall_x64
 do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x66/0xd0

---

diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.c b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
index 7647e9f6e190..db3c68fbbadf 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ static struct inode *ext4_xattr_inode_create(handle_t *handle,
 		 */
 		dquot_free_inode(ea_inode);
 		dquot_drop(ea_inode);
-		inode_lock(ea_inode);
+		inode_lock_nested(inode, I_MUTEX_XATTR);
 		ea_inode->i_flags |= S_NOQUOTA;
 		inode_unlock(ea_inode);
 	}

             reply	other threads:[~2024-11-12  7:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-11-12  7:34 Sergey Senozhatsky [this message]
2024-11-12 15:29 ` ext4: possible circular locking dependency at ext4_xattr_inode_create Theodore Ts'o
2024-11-13  4:04   ` Sergey Senozhatsky
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2024-11-12  7:51 Sergey Senozhatsky

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