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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@kernel.org>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	KVM <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/4] x86/bugs: Add SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO support
Date: Mon,  2 Dec 2024 13:04:13 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241202120416.6054-2-bp@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241202120416.6054-1-bp@kernel.org>

From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>

If the machine has:

  CPUID Fn8000_0021_EAX[30] (SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO) -- If this bit is 1,
  it indicates the CPU is not subject to the SRSO vulnerability across
  user/kernel boundaries.

have it fall back to IBPB on VMEXIT only, in the case it is going to run
VMs:

  Speculative Return Stack Overflow: CPU user/kernel transitions protected, falling back to IBPB-on-VMEXIT
  Speculative Return Stack Overflow: Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT only

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c         | 6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c       | 1 +
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 17b6590748c0..2787227a8b42 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -464,6 +464,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_SBPB		(20*32+27) /* Selective Branch Prediction Barrier */
 #define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE		(20*32+28) /* MSR_PRED_CMD[IBPB] flushes all branch type predictions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO		(20*32+29) /* CPU is not affected by SRSO */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO	(20*32+30) /* CPU is not affected by SRSO across user/kernel boundaries */
 
 /*
  * Extended auxiliary flags: Linux defined - for features scattered in various
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 47a01d4028f6..8854d9bce2a5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2615,6 +2615,11 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 		break;
 
 	case SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET:
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO)) {
+			pr_notice("CPU user/kernel transitions protected, falling back to IBPB-on-VMEXIT\n");
+			goto ibpb_on_vmexit;
+		}
+
 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) {
 			/*
 			 * Enable the return thunk for generated code
@@ -2658,6 +2663,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 		}
 		break;
 
+ibpb_on_vmexit:
 	case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) {
 			if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index a5c28975c608..954f9c727f11 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1270,6 +1270,7 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 	VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO),
 	VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO),
 	VULNBL_AMD(0x19, SRSO),
+	VULNBL_AMD(0x1a, SRSO),
 	{}
 };
 
-- 
2.43.0


  reply	other threads:[~2024-12-02 12:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-12-02 12:04 [PATCH v2 0/4] x86/bugs: Adjust SRSO mitigation to new features Borislav Petkov
2024-12-02 12:04 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2024-12-10  6:53   ` [PATCH v2 1/4] x86/bugs: Add SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO support Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-10 15:37     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11  7:53       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-11 20:38         ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 22:35           ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-16 17:21             ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-30 17:02   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov (AMD)
2024-12-02 12:04 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] KVM: x86: Advertise SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO to userspace Borislav Petkov
2024-12-30 17:02   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov (AMD)
2024-12-02 12:04 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 22:27   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-16 17:31     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-16 18:51       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-17  9:34         ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-30 11:14         ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 13:38           ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-08 15:49             ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 17:18               ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-08 18:14                 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 18:37                   ` Jim Mattson
2025-01-08 19:14                     ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 19:43                       ` Jim Mattson
2025-01-08 19:45                         ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-11 12:52                   ` [PATCH] " Borislav Petkov
2025-01-17 18:56                     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-18 15:26                       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-23 16:25                         ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-23 17:01                           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-23 18:04                             ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-24 12:58                               ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-11 19:19                                 ` Jim Mattson
2025-02-11 20:51                                   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-13 10:53                             ` Patrick Bellasi
2025-02-13 13:44                               ` Patrick Bellasi
2025-02-13 14:28                                 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-13 17:50                                   ` Patrick Bellasi
2025-02-14 20:10                                     ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-15  0:57                                       ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-15  9:15                                         ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-17  5:47                                           ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-17 15:26                                             ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-15 12:53                                       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-17  5:59                                         ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-17 16:07                                           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-17 19:56                                             ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-17 20:20                                               ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-17 20:32                                                 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-18 11:13                                                   ` [PATCH final?] " Borislav Petkov
2025-02-18 14:42                                                     ` Patrick Bellasi
2025-02-18 15:34                                                       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-29 13:25                                                     ` x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX, back for moar Borislav Petkov
2025-04-30 23:33                                                       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-01  0:42                                                         ` Michael Larabel
2025-05-01  8:19                                                         ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-01 16:56                                                           ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-05 15:25                                                             ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-05 15:40                                                               ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-05 15:47                                                                 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-05 16:30                                                                 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-05 16:42                                                                   ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-05 18:03                                                                     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-05 18:25                                                                       ` Kaplan, David
2024-12-02 12:04 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] Documentation/kernel-parameters: Fix a typo in kvm.enable_virt_at_load text Borislav Petkov
2024-12-30 17:21   ` [tip: x86/cleanups] " tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov (AMD)
2024-12-03 14:30 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] x86/bugs: Adjust SRSO mitigation to new features Nikolay Borisov
2025-02-26 14:32 ` [tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov

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