From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>,
Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH net-next 09/37] rxrpc: Separate the packet length from the data length in rxrpc_txbuf
Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2024 14:30:27 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241202143057.378147-10-dhowells@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241202143057.378147-1-dhowells@redhat.com>
Separate the packet length from the data length (txb->len) stored in the
rxrpc_txbuf to make security calculations easier. Also store the
allocation size as that's an upper bound on the size of the security
wrapper and change a number of fields to unsigned short as the amount of
data can't exceed the capacity of a UDP packet.
Also, whilst we're at it, use kzalloc() for txbufs.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h | 8 +++++---
net/rxrpc/insecure.c | 1 +
net/rxrpc/output.c | 7 ++++---
net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c | 1 -
net/rxrpc/txbuf.c | 7 ++-----
6 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h
index 69e6f4b20bad..a5c0bc917641 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h
+++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h
@@ -821,9 +821,11 @@ struct rxrpc_txbuf {
rxrpc_serial_t serial; /* Last serial number transmitted with */
unsigned int call_debug_id;
unsigned int debug_id;
- unsigned int len; /* Amount of data in buffer */
- unsigned int space; /* Remaining data space */
- unsigned int offset; /* Offset of fill point */
+ unsigned short len; /* Amount of data in buffer */
+ unsigned short space; /* Remaining data space */
+ unsigned short offset; /* Offset of fill point */
+ unsigned short pkt_len; /* Size of packet content */
+ unsigned short alloc_size; /* Amount of bufferage allocated */
unsigned int flags;
#define RXRPC_TXBUF_WIRE_FLAGS 0xff /* The wire protocol flags */
#define RXRPC_TXBUF_RESENT 0x100 /* Set if has been resent */
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/insecure.c b/net/rxrpc/insecure.c
index 751eb621021d..d665f486be5f 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/insecure.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/insecure.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static struct rxrpc_txbuf *none_alloc_txbuf(struct rxrpc_call *call, size_t rema
static int none_secure_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb)
{
+ txb->pkt_len = txb->len;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/output.c b/net/rxrpc/output.c
index 9168c149444c..5f33e6c50854 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/output.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/output.c
@@ -382,11 +382,11 @@ static size_t rxrpc_prepare_data_subpacket(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct rxrpc
enum rxrpc_req_ack_trace why;
struct rxrpc_connection *conn = call->conn;
struct kvec *kv = &call->local->kvec[subpkt];
- size_t len = txb->len;
+ size_t len = txb->pkt_len;
bool last, more;
u8 flags;
- _enter("%x,{%d}", txb->seq, txb->len);
+ _enter("%x,%zd", txb->seq, len);
txb->serial = serial;
@@ -440,6 +440,7 @@ static size_t rxrpc_prepare_data_subpacket(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct rxrpc
whdr->cksum = txb->cksum;
whdr->serviceId = htons(conn->service_id);
kv->iov_base = whdr;
+ len += sizeof(*whdr);
// TODO: Convert into a jumbo header for tail subpackets
trace_rxrpc_tx_data(call, txb->seq, txb->serial, flags, false);
@@ -508,7 +509,7 @@ static int rxrpc_send_data_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct rxrpc_txbuf *t
size_t len;
int ret;
- _enter("%x,{%d}", txb->seq, txb->len);
+ _enter("%x,{%d}", txb->seq, txb->pkt_len);
len = rxrpc_prepare_data_packet(call, txb);
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
index e3194d73dd84..755897fab626 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
@@ -148,14 +148,14 @@ static int rxkad_init_connection_security(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
static struct rxrpc_txbuf *rxkad_alloc_txbuf(struct rxrpc_call *call, size_t remain, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb;
- size_t shdr, space;
+ size_t shdr, alloc, limit, part;
remain = umin(remain, 65535 - sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header));
switch (call->conn->security_level) {
default:
- space = umin(remain, RXRPC_JUMBO_DATALEN);
- return rxrpc_alloc_data_txbuf(call, space, 1, gfp);
+ alloc = umin(remain, RXRPC_JUMBO_DATALEN);
+ return rxrpc_alloc_data_txbuf(call, alloc, 1, gfp);
case RXRPC_SECURITY_AUTH:
shdr = sizeof(struct rxkad_level1_hdr);
break;
@@ -164,15 +164,21 @@ static struct rxrpc_txbuf *rxkad_alloc_txbuf(struct rxrpc_call *call, size_t rem
break;
}
- space = umin(round_down(RXRPC_JUMBO_DATALEN, RXKAD_ALIGN), remain + shdr);
- space = round_up(space, RXKAD_ALIGN);
+ limit = round_down(RXRPC_JUMBO_DATALEN, RXKAD_ALIGN) - shdr;
+ if (remain < limit) {
+ part = remain;
+ alloc = round_up(shdr + part, RXKAD_ALIGN);
+ } else {
+ part = limit;
+ alloc = RXRPC_JUMBO_DATALEN;
+ }
- txb = rxrpc_alloc_data_txbuf(call, space, RXKAD_ALIGN, gfp);
+ txb = rxrpc_alloc_data_txbuf(call, alloc, RXKAD_ALIGN, gfp);
if (!txb)
return NULL;
txb->offset += shdr;
- txb->space -= shdr;
+ txb->space = part;
return txb;
}
@@ -263,13 +269,13 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet_auth(const struct rxrpc_call *call,
check = txb->seq ^ call->call_id;
hdr->data_size = htonl((u32)check << 16 | txb->len);
- txb->len += sizeof(struct rxkad_level1_hdr);
- pad = txb->len;
+ txb->pkt_len = sizeof(struct rxkad_level1_hdr) + txb->len;
+ pad = txb->pkt_len;
pad = RXKAD_ALIGN - pad;
pad &= RXKAD_ALIGN - 1;
if (pad) {
memset(txb->kvec[0].iov_base + txb->offset, 0, pad);
- txb->len += pad;
+ txb->pkt_len += pad;
}
/* start the encryption afresh */
@@ -298,7 +304,7 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet_encrypt(const struct rxrpc_call *call,
struct rxkad_level2_hdr *rxkhdr = (void *)(whdr + 1);
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
struct scatterlist sg;
- size_t pad;
+ size_t content, pad;
u16 check;
int ret;
@@ -309,23 +315,20 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet_encrypt(const struct rxrpc_call *call,
rxkhdr->data_size = htonl(txb->len | (u32)check << 16);
rxkhdr->checksum = 0;
- txb->len += sizeof(struct rxkad_level2_hdr);
- pad = txb->len;
- pad = RXKAD_ALIGN - pad;
- pad &= RXKAD_ALIGN - 1;
- if (pad) {
+ content = sizeof(struct rxkad_level2_hdr) + txb->len;
+ txb->pkt_len = round_up(content, RXKAD_ALIGN);
+ pad = txb->pkt_len - content;
+ if (pad)
memset(txb->kvec[0].iov_base + txb->offset, 0, pad);
- txb->len += pad;
- }
/* encrypt from the session key */
token = call->conn->key->payload.data[0];
memcpy(&iv, token->kad->session_key, sizeof(iv));
- sg_init_one(&sg, rxkhdr, txb->len);
+ sg_init_one(&sg, rxkhdr, txb->pkt_len);
skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, call->conn->rxkad.cipher);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
- skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, txb->len, iv.x);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, txb->pkt_len, iv.x);
ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
return ret;
@@ -384,6 +387,7 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb)
switch (call->conn->security_level) {
case RXRPC_SECURITY_PLAIN:
+ txb->pkt_len = txb->len;
ret = 0;
break;
case RXRPC_SECURITY_AUTH:
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c b/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c
index 546abb463c3f..786c1fb1369a 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c
@@ -391,7 +391,6 @@ static int rxrpc_send_data(struct rxrpc_sock *rx,
goto out;
txb->kvec[0].iov_len += txb->len;
- txb->len = txb->kvec[0].iov_len;
rxrpc_queue_packet(rx, call, txb, notify_end_tx);
txb = NULL;
}
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/txbuf.c b/net/rxrpc/txbuf.c
index 2a4291617d40..8b7c854ed3d7 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/txbuf.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/txbuf.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ struct rxrpc_txbuf *rxrpc_alloc_data_txbuf(struct rxrpc_call *call, size_t data_
size_t total, hoff;
void *buf;
- txb = kmalloc(sizeof(*txb), gfp);
+ txb = kzalloc(sizeof(*txb), gfp);
if (!txb)
return NULL;
@@ -49,14 +49,11 @@ struct rxrpc_txbuf *rxrpc_alloc_data_txbuf(struct rxrpc_call *call, size_t data_
txb->last_sent = KTIME_MIN;
txb->call_debug_id = call->debug_id;
txb->debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&rxrpc_txbuf_debug_ids);
+ txb->alloc_size = data_size;
txb->space = data_size;
- txb->len = 0;
txb->offset = sizeof(*whdr);
txb->flags = call->conn->out_clientflag;
- txb->ack_why = 0;
txb->seq = call->tx_prepared + 1;
- txb->serial = 0;
- txb->cksum = 0;
txb->nr_kvec = 1;
txb->kvec[0].iov_base = whdr;
txb->kvec[0].iov_len = sizeof(*whdr);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-12-02 14:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-12-02 14:30 [PATCH net-next 00/37] rxrpc: Implement jumbo DATA transmission and RACK-TLP David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 01/37] rxrpc: Fix handling of received connection abort David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 02/37] rxrpc: Use umin() and umax() rather than min_t()/max_t() where possible David Howells
2024-12-05 2:37 ` David Laight
2024-12-05 10:50 ` David Howells
2024-12-05 11:01 ` David Laight
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 03/37] rxrpc: Clean up Tx header flags generation handling David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 04/37] rxrpc: Don't set the MORE-PACKETS rxrpc wire header flag David Howells
2024-12-03 3:42 ` Jakub Kicinski
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 05/37] rxrpc: Show stats counter for received reason-0 ACKs David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 06/37] rxrpc: Request an ACK on impending Tx stall David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 07/37] rxrpc: Use a large kvec[] in rxrpc_local rather than every rxrpc_txbuf David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 08/37] rxrpc: Implement path-MTU probing using padded PING ACKs (RFC8899) David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` David Howells [this message]
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 10/37] rxrpc: Prepare to be able to send jumbo DATA packets David Howells
2024-12-03 3:43 ` Jakub Kicinski
2024-12-03 19:52 ` David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 11/37] rxrpc: Add a tracepoint to show variables pertinent to jumbo packet size David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 12/37] rxrpc: Fix CPU time starvation in I/O thread David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 13/37] rxrpc: Fix injection of packet loss David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 14/37] rxrpc: Only set DF=1 on initial DATA transmission David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 15/37] rxrpc: Timestamp DATA packets before transmitting them David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 16/37] rxrpc: Implement progressive transmission queue struct David Howells
2024-12-03 3:44 ` Jakub Kicinski
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 17/37] rxrpc: call->acks_hard_ack is now the same call->tx_bottom, so remove it David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 18/37] rxrpc: Replace call->acks_first_seq with tracking of the hard ACK point David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 19/37] rxrpc: Display stats about jumbo packets transmitted and received David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 20/37] rxrpc: Adjust names and types of congestion-related fields David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 21/37] rxrpc: Use the new rxrpc_tx_queue struct to more efficiently process ACKs David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 22/37] rxrpc: Store the DATA serial in the txqueue and use this in RTT calc David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 23/37] rxrpc: Don't use received skbuff timestamps David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 24/37] rxrpc: Generate rtt_min David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 25/37] rxrpc: Adjust the rxrpc_rtt_rx tracepoint David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 26/37] rxrpc: Display userStatus in rxrpc_rx_ack trace David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 27/37] rxrpc: Fix the calculation and use of RTO David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 28/37] rxrpc: Fix initial resend timeout David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 29/37] rxrpc: Send jumbo DATA packets David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 30/37] rxrpc: Don't allocate a txbuf for an ACK transmission David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 31/37] rxrpc: Use irq-disabling spinlocks between app and I/O thread David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 32/37] rxrpc: Tidy up the ACK parsing a bit David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 33/37] rxrpc: Add a reason indicator to the tx_data tracepoint David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 34/37] rxrpc: Add a reason indicator to the tx_ack tracepoint David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 35/37] rxrpc: Manage RTT per-call rather than per-peer David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 36/37] rxrpc: Fix request for an ACK when cwnd is minimum David Howells
2024-12-02 14:30 ` [PATCH net-next 37/37] rxrpc: Implement RACK/TLP to deal with transmission stalls [RFC8985] David Howells
2024-12-03 3:48 ` Jakub Kicinski
2024-12-03 19:54 ` David Howells
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