From: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
To: Shervin Oloumi <enlightened@chromium.org>,
mic@digikod.net, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz,
paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, gnoack@google.com,
shuah@kernel.org, jorgelo@chromium.org, allenwebb@chromium.org,
Shervin Oloumi <enlightened@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] fs: add loopback/bind mount specific security hook
Date: Tue, 31 Dec 2024 13:28:53 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202412311303.Cb16SNL3-lkp@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241231014632.589049-1-enlightened@chromium.org>
Hi Shervin,
kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:
[auto build test ERROR on fc033cf25e612e840e545f8d5ad2edd6ba613ed5]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Shervin-Oloumi/landlock-add-support-for-private-bind-mount/20241231-094806
base: fc033cf25e612e840e545f8d5ad2edd6ba613ed5
patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241231014632.589049-1-enlightened%40chromium.org
patch subject: [PATCH 1/2] fs: add loopback/bind mount specific security hook
config: sparc-randconfig-002-20241231 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20241231/202412311303.Cb16SNL3-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: sparc-linux-gcc (GCC) 14.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20241231/202412311303.Cb16SNL3-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202412311303.Cb16SNL3-lkp@intel.com/
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
fs/namespace.c: In function 'do_loopback':
>> fs/namespace.c:2768:15: error: implicit declaration of function 'security_sb_bindmount'; did you mean 'security_sb_umount'? [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
2768 | err = security_sb_bindmount(&old_path, path);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| security_sb_umount
vim +2768 fs/namespace.c
2751
2752 /*
2753 * do loopback mount.
2754 */
2755 static int do_loopback(struct path *path, const char *old_name,
2756 int recurse)
2757 {
2758 struct path old_path;
2759 struct mount *mnt = NULL, *parent;
2760 struct mountpoint *mp;
2761 int err;
2762 if (!old_name || !*old_name)
2763 return -EINVAL;
2764 err = kern_path(old_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path);
2765 if (err)
2766 return err;
2767
> 2768 err = security_sb_bindmount(&old_path, path);
2769 if (err)
2770 goto out;
2771
2772 err = -EINVAL;
2773 if (mnt_ns_loop(old_path.dentry))
2774 goto out;
2775
2776 mp = lock_mount(path);
2777 if (IS_ERR(mp)) {
2778 err = PTR_ERR(mp);
2779 goto out;
2780 }
2781
2782 parent = real_mount(path->mnt);
2783 if (!check_mnt(parent))
2784 goto out2;
2785
2786 mnt = __do_loopback(&old_path, recurse);
2787 if (IS_ERR(mnt)) {
2788 err = PTR_ERR(mnt);
2789 goto out2;
2790 }
2791
2792 err = graft_tree(mnt, parent, mp);
2793 if (err) {
2794 lock_mount_hash();
2795 umount_tree(mnt, UMOUNT_SYNC);
2796 unlock_mount_hash();
2797 }
2798 out2:
2799 unlock_mount(mp);
2800 out:
2801 path_put(&old_path);
2802 return err;
2803 }
2804
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-12-31 5:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-12-31 1:46 [PATCH 1/2] fs: add loopback/bind mount specific security hook Shervin Oloumi
2024-12-31 1:46 ` [PATCH 2/2] landlock: add support for private bind mount Shervin Oloumi
2024-12-31 21:03 ` kernel test robot
2024-12-31 5:28 ` kernel test robot [this message]
2024-12-31 6:01 ` [PATCH 1/2] fs: add loopback/bind mount specific security hook kernel test robot
2024-12-31 16:43 ` Casey Schaufler
2025-01-03 5:11 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-10 4:11 ` Shervin Oloumi
2025-01-03 11:10 ` Jan Kara
2025-01-10 4:14 ` Shervin Oloumi
2025-01-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v3 " Christian Brauner
2025-01-23 20:34 ` Mickaël Salaün
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2025-01-10 2:10 Shervin Oloumi
2025-01-10 2:10 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] landlock: add support for private bind mount Shervin Oloumi
2025-01-23 20:34 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-23 21:08 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-23 22:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
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