From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] fortify: Move FORTIFY_SOURCE under 'Kernel hardening options'
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2025 13:25:54 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202501201324.AE24A0C67@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250117130337.4716-4-mgorman@techsingularity.net>
On Fri, Jan 17, 2025 at 01:03:37PM +0000, Mel Gorman wrote:
> FORTIFY_SOURCE is a hardening option both at build and runtime. Move
> it under 'Kernel hardening options'.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
> ---
> security/Kconfig | 9 ---------
> security/Kconfig.hardening | 9 +++++++++
> 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index fe7346dc4bc3..bca84f839fbe 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -159,15 +159,6 @@ config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
> this low address space will need the permission specific to the
> systems running LSM.
>
> -config FORTIFY_SOURCE
> - bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
> - depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
> - # https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/53645
> - depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || !X86_32
> - help
> - Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
> - where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
> -
> config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
> bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
> help
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
> index 537a6431892e..8d005fe154ef 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
> +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
> @@ -301,6 +301,15 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_DEFAULT_ON
> This has the effect of setting "hardened_usercopy=on" on the kernel
> command line. This can be disabled with "hardened_usercopy=off".
>
> +config FORTIFY_SOURCE
> + bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
> + depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
> + # https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/53645
> + depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || !X86_32
> + help
> + Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
> + where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
> +
> endmenu
Please move this before HARDENED_USERCOPY -- it's a more general config
and also comes first alphabetically. ;)
I would note that the LLVM bug referenced was fixed in Clang 15+, a
separate patch (not required by you) should fix that if it the tests
actually pass on x86_32 again...
>
> menu "Hardening of kernel data structures"
> --
> 2.43.0
>
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-01-20 21:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-01-17 13:03 [PATCH 0/3] Allow default HARDENED_USERCOPY to be set at compile time Mel Gorman
2025-01-17 13:03 ` [PATCH 1/3] mm: security: Move hardened usercopy under 'Kernel hardening options' Mel Gorman
2025-01-20 21:10 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-21 9:21 ` Mel Gorman
2025-01-20 21:42 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-17 13:03 ` [PATCH 2/3] mm: security: Allow default HARDENED_USERCOPY to be set at compile time Mel Gorman
2025-01-20 21:21 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-21 12:35 ` Mel Gorman
2025-01-17 13:03 ` [PATCH 3/3] fortify: Move FORTIFY_SOURCE under 'Kernel hardening options' Mel Gorman
2025-01-20 21:25 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2025-01-20 21:08 ` [PATCH 0/3] Allow default HARDENED_USERCOPY to be set at compile time Kees Cook
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