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From: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
To: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/4] Allow default HARDENED_USERCOPY to be set at compile time
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 17:19:21 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250122171925.25472-1-mgorman@techsingularity.net> (raw)

Changelog since v1
o Menu section rename
o Make static branch usage similar to init_on_alloc
o Change ordering of menu options

Some hardening options like HARDENED_USERCOPY can be set at boot time
and have negligible cost when disabled. The default for options like
init_on_alloc= can be set at compile time but hardened usercopy is
enabled by default if built in. This incurs overhead when a kernel
wishes to provide optional hardening but the user does not necessarily
care.

Hardening is desirable in some environments but ideally they would be opt-in
by kernel command line as hardening is typically a deliberate decision
whereas the performance overhead is not always obvious to all users.
Patches 1 and 2 move HARDENED_USERCOPY to the Kconfig.hardening and
default it to disabled. Patch 3 moves the static branch check to a fast
path similar to init_on_*. Patch 4 moves FORTIFY_SOURCE to hardening only
because the option is related to hardening and happened to be declared
near HARDENED_USERCOPY.

Building HARDENED_USERCOPY but disabled at runtime has neligible effect
within the noise. Enabling the option by default generally incurs 2-10%
of overhead depending on the workload with some extreme outliers depending
on the exact CPU. While the benchmarks are somewhat synthetic, the overhead
IO-intensive and network-intensive is easily detectable but the root cause
may not be obvious (e.g. 2-14% overhead for netperf TCP_STREAM running
over localhost with different ranges depending on the CPU).

 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |  4 ++-
 include/linux/thread_info.h                   |  8 +++++
 mm/usercopy.c                                 | 14 ++++----
 security/Kconfig                              | 21 ------------
 security/Kconfig.hardening                    | 33 +++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

-- 
2.43.0


             reply	other threads:[~2025-01-22 17:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-01-22 17:19 Mel Gorman [this message]
2025-01-22 17:19 ` [PATCH 1/4] mm: security: Move hardened usercopy under 'Kernel hardening options' Mel Gorman
2025-01-22 17:19 ` [PATCH 2/4] mm: security: Allow default HARDENED_USERCOPY to be set at compile time Mel Gorman
2025-01-23  0:57   ` Kees Cook
2025-01-23 11:37     ` Mel Gorman
2025-01-23 21:10     ` David Laight
2025-01-22 17:19 ` [PATCH 3/4] mm: security: Check early if HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled Mel Gorman
2025-01-23  1:01   ` Kees Cook
2025-01-23 11:47     ` Mel Gorman
2025-01-22 17:19 ` [PATCH 4/4] fortify: Move FORTIFY_SOURCE under 'Kernel hardening options' Mel Gorman
2025-01-22 21:42   ` Paul Moore
2025-01-23  1:02 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] Allow default HARDENED_USERCOPY to be set at compile time Kees Cook
2025-01-23 11:49   ` Mel Gorman

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