All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Hamza Mahfooz <hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Hamza Mahfooz" <hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Jens Axboe" <axboe@kernel.dk>,
	"Pavel Begunkov" <asml.silence@gmail.com>,
	"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	"Ondrej Mosnacek" <omosnace@redhat.com>,
	"Bram Bonné" <brambonne@google.com>,
	"Thiébaud Weksteen" <tweek@google.com>,
	"Christian Göttsche" <cgzones@googlemail.com>,
	"Masahiro Yamada" <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, io-uring@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 2/2] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for io_uring_setup()
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2025 10:57:18 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250127155723.67711-2-hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250127155723.67711-1-hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com>

It is desirable to allow LSM to configure accessibility to io_uring
because it is a coarse yet very simple way to restrict access to it. So,
add an LSM for io_uring_allowed() to guard access to io_uring.

Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Hamza Mahfooz <hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h       |  1 +
 include/linux/security.h            |  5 +++++
 io_uring/io_uring.c                 |  2 +-
 security/security.c                 | 12 ++++++++++++
 security/selinux/hooks.c            | 14 ++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/include/classmap.h |  2 +-
 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index e2f1ce37c41e..9eb313bd0c93 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -455,6 +455,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_write, struct perf_event *event)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_override_creds, const struct cred *new)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_sqpoll, void)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_cmd, struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_allowed, void)
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
 
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, initramfs_populated, void)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 980b6c207cad..3e68f8468a22 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -2362,6 +2362,7 @@ static inline int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
 extern int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new);
 extern int security_uring_sqpoll(void);
 extern int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd);
+extern int security_uring_allowed(void);
 #else
 static inline int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
 {
@@ -2375,6 +2376,10 @@ static inline int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+extern int security_uring_allowed(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
 
diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c
index c2d8bd4c2cfc..9df7b3b556ef 100644
--- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
@@ -3808,7 +3808,7 @@ static inline int io_uring_allowed(void)
 		return -EPERM;
 
 allowed_lsm:
-	return 0;
+	return security_uring_allowed();
 }
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(io_uring_setup, u32, entries,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 143561ebc3e8..c9fae447327e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -5999,6 +5999,18 @@ int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 {
 	return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, ioucmd);
 }
+
+/**
+ * security_uring_allowed() - Check if io_uring_setup() is allowed
+ *
+ * Check whether the current task is allowed to call io_uring_setup().
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_uring_allowed(void)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(uring_allowed);
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7b867dfec88b..fb37e87df226 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7137,6 +7137,19 @@ static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), isec->sid,
 			    SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
 }
+
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_allowed - check if io_uring_setup() can be called
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to call io_uring_setup().
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_allowed(void)
+{
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__ALLOWED,
+			    NULL);
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
 
 static const struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = {
@@ -7390,6 +7403,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_allowed, selinux_uring_allowed),
 #endif
 
 	/*
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 03e82477dce9..8a8f3908aac8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ const struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	{ "perf_event",
 	  { "open", "cpu", "kernel", "tracepoint", "read", "write", NULL } },
 	{ "anon_inode", { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
-	{ "io_uring", { "override_creds", "sqpoll", "cmd", NULL } },
+	{ "io_uring", { "override_creds", "sqpoll", "cmd", "allowed", NULL } },
 	{ "user_namespace", { "create", NULL } },
 	/* last one */ { NULL, {} }
 };
-- 
2.47.1


  reply	other threads:[~2025-01-27 15:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-01-27 15:57 [PATCH v3 1/2] io_uring: refactor io_uring_allowed() Hamza Mahfooz
2025-01-27 15:57 ` Hamza Mahfooz [this message]
2025-01-27 17:18   ` [PATCH v3 2/2] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for io_uring_setup() Casey Schaufler
2025-01-27 21:23     ` Paul Moore
2025-01-28  0:23       ` Casey Schaufler
2025-01-28 22:35         ` Paul Moore
2025-01-29  0:02           ` Casey Schaufler
2025-01-30 17:15             ` Paul Moore
2025-02-07 21:42   ` Paul Moore
2025-02-07 21:53     ` Hamza Mahfooz
2025-02-07 21:42 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] io_uring: refactor io_uring_allowed() Paul Moore
2025-02-07 21:54   ` Jens Axboe
2025-02-07 22:21     ` Paul Moore

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20250127155723.67711-2-hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com \
    --to=hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com \
    --cc=asml.silence@gmail.com \
    --cc=axboe@kernel.dk \
    --cc=brambonne@google.com \
    --cc=cgzones@googlemail.com \
    --cc=io-uring@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=masahiroy@kernel.org \
    --cc=omosnace@redhat.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com \
    --cc=tweek@google.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.