From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: broonie@kernel.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com, eauger@redhat.com,
eric.auger@redhat.com, fweimer@redhat.com, jeremy.linton@arm.com,
mark.rutland@arm.com, maz@kernel.org, oliver.upton@linux.dev,
pbonzini@redhat.com, stable@vger.kernel.org, tabba@google.com,
wilco.dijkstra@arm.com, will@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 8/8] KVM: arm64: Eagerly switch ZCR_EL{1,2}
Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2025 14:11:02 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250206141102.954688-9-mark.rutland@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250206141102.954688-1-mark.rutland@arm.com>
In non-protected KVM modes, while the guest FPSIMD/SVE/SME state is live on the
CPU, the host's active SVE VL may differ from the guest's maximum SVE VL:
* For VHE hosts, when a VM uses NV, ZCR_EL2 contains a value constrained
by the guest hypervisor, which may be less than or equal to that
guest's maximum VL.
Note: in this case the value of ZCR_EL1 is immaterial due to E2H.
* For nVHE/hVHE hosts, ZCR_EL1 contains a value written by the guest,
which may be less than or greater than the guest's maximum VL.
Note: in this case hyp code traps host SVE usage and lazily restores
ZCR_EL2 to the host's maximum VL, which may be greater than the
guest's maximum VL.
This can be the case between exiting a guest and kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp().
If a softirq is taken during this period and the softirq handler tries
to use kernel-mode NEON, then the kernel will fail to save the guest's
FPSIMD/SVE state, and will pend a SIGKILL for the current thread.
This happens because kvm_arch_vcpu_ctxsync_fp() binds the guest's live
FPSIMD/SVE state with the guest's maximum SVE VL, and
fpsimd_save_user_state() verifies that the live SVE VL is as expected
before attempting to save the register state:
| if (WARN_ON(sve_get_vl() != vl)) {
| force_signal_inject(SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, 0, 0);
| return;
| }
Fix this and make this a bit easier to reason about by always eagerly
switching ZCR_EL{1,2} at hyp during guest<->host transitions. With this
happening, there's no need to trap host SVE usage, and the nVHE/nVHVE
__deactivate_cptr_traps() logic can be simplified enable host access to
all present FPSIMD/SVE/SME features.
In protected nVHE/hVHVE modes, the host's state is always saved/restored
by hyp, and the guest's state is saved prior to exit to the host, so
from the host's PoV the guest never has live FPSIMD/SVE/SME state, and
the host's ZCR_EL1 is never clobbered by hyp.
Fixes: 8c8010d69c132273 ("KVM: arm64: Save/restore SVE state for nVHE")
Fixes: 2e3cf82063a00ea0 ("KVM: arm64: nv: Ensure correct VL is loaded before saving SVE state")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c | 30 ---------------
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c | 13 +++----
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c | 6 +--
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c | 4 ++
5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
index f64724197958e..3cbb999419af7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c
@@ -136,36 +136,6 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
local_irq_save(flags);
if (guest_owns_fp_regs()) {
- if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu)) {
- u64 zcr = read_sysreg_el1(SYS_ZCR);
-
- /*
- * If the vCPU is in the hyp context then ZCR_EL1 is
- * loaded with its vEL2 counterpart.
- */
- __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, vcpu_sve_zcr_elx(vcpu)) = zcr;
-
- /*
- * Restore the VL that was saved when bound to the CPU,
- * which is the maximum VL for the guest. Because the
- * layout of the data when saving the sve state depends
- * on the VL, we need to use a consistent (i.e., the
- * maximum) VL.
- * Note that this means that at guest exit ZCR_EL1 is
- * not necessarily the same as on guest entry.
- *
- * ZCR_EL2 holds the guest hypervisor's VL when running
- * a nested guest, which could be smaller than the
- * max for the vCPU. Similar to above, we first need to
- * switch to a VL consistent with the layout of the
- * vCPU's SVE state. KVM support for NV implies VHE, so
- * using the ZCR_EL1 alias is safe.
- */
- if (!has_vhe() || (vcpu_has_nv(vcpu) && !is_hyp_ctxt(vcpu)))
- sve_cond_update_zcr_vq(vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1,
- SYS_ZCR_EL1);
- }
-
/*
* Flush (save and invalidate) the fpsimd/sve state so that if
* the host tries to use fpsimd/sve, it's not using stale data
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
index 163867f7f7c52..bbec7cd38da33 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
@@ -375,6 +375,57 @@ static inline void __hyp_sve_save_host(void)
true);
}
+static inline void fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ u64 zcr_el1, zcr_el2;
+
+ if (!guest_owns_fp_regs())
+ return;
+
+ if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu)) {
+ /* A guest hypervisor may restrict the effective max VL. */
+ if (vcpu_has_nv(vcpu) && !is_hyp_ctxt(vcpu))
+ zcr_el2 = __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, ZCR_EL2);
+ else
+ zcr_el2 = vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1;
+
+ write_sysreg_el2(zcr_el2, SYS_ZCR);
+
+ zcr_el1 = __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, vcpu_sve_zcr_elx(vcpu));
+ write_sysreg_el1(zcr_el1, SYS_ZCR);
+ }
+}
+
+static inline void fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ u64 zcr_el1, zcr_el2;
+
+ if (!guest_owns_fp_regs())
+ return;
+
+ if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu)) {
+ zcr_el1 = read_sysreg_el1(SYS_ZCR);
+ __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, vcpu_sve_zcr_elx(vcpu)) = zcr_el1;
+
+ /*
+ * The guest's state is always saved using the guest's max VL.
+ * Ensure that the host has the guest's max VL active such that
+ * the host can save the guest's state lazily, but don't
+ * artificially restrict the host to the guest's max VL.
+ */
+ if (has_vhe()) {
+ zcr_el2 = vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1;
+ write_sysreg_el2(zcr_el2, SYS_ZCR);
+ } else {
+ zcr_el2 = sve_vq_from_vl(kvm_host_sve_max_vl) - 1;
+ write_sysreg_el2(zcr_el2, SYS_ZCR);
+
+ zcr_el1 = vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1;
+ write_sysreg_el1(zcr_el1, SYS_ZCR);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
static void kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
/*
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
index ad1abd5493862..0c745a578aa7e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
*/
#include <hyp/adjust_pc.h>
+#include <hyp/switch.h>
#include <asm/pgtable-types.h>
#include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
@@ -200,8 +201,12 @@ static void handle___kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
sync_hyp_vcpu(hyp_vcpu);
} else {
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = kern_hyp_va(host_vcpu);
+
/* The host is fully trusted, run its vCPU directly. */
- ret = __kvm_vcpu_run(kern_hyp_va(host_vcpu));
+ fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
+ ret = __kvm_vcpu_run(vcpu);
+ fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_host(vcpu);
}
out:
cpu_reg(host_ctxt, 1) = ret;
@@ -651,12 +656,6 @@ void handle_trap(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
case ESR_ELx_EC_SMC64:
handle_host_smc(host_ctxt);
break;
- case ESR_ELx_EC_SVE:
- cpacr_clear_set(0, CPACR_EL1_ZEN);
- isb();
- sve_cond_update_zcr_vq(sve_vq_from_vl(kvm_host_sve_max_vl) - 1,
- SYS_ZCR_EL2);
- break;
case ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW:
case ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_LOW:
handle_host_mem_abort(host_ctxt);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
index 324b62329c10b..eaeda9c8a1aa6 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
@@ -73,12 +73,10 @@ static void __activate_cptr_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static void __deactivate_cptr_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- struct kvm *kvm = kern_hyp_va(vcpu->kvm);
-
if (has_hvhe()) {
u64 val = CPACR_EL1_FPEN;
- if (!kvm_has_sve(kvm) || !guest_owns_fp_regs())
+ if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SVE))
val |= CPACR_EL1_ZEN;
if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SME))
val |= CPACR_EL1_SMEN;
@@ -87,7 +85,7 @@ static void __deactivate_cptr_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
} else {
u64 val = CPTR_NVHE_EL2_RES1;
- if (kvm_has_sve(kvm) && guest_owns_fp_regs())
+ if (!cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SVE))
val |= CPTR_EL2_TZ;
if (!cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SME))
val |= CPTR_EL2_TSM;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
index c854d84458892..647737d6e8d0b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
@@ -579,6 +579,8 @@ static int __kvm_vcpu_run_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
sysreg_save_host_state_vhe(host_ctxt);
+ fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
+
/*
* Note that ARM erratum 1165522 requires us to configure both stage 1
* and stage 2 translation for the guest context before we clear
@@ -603,6 +605,8 @@ static int __kvm_vcpu_run_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
__deactivate_traps(vcpu);
+ fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_host(vcpu);
+
sysreg_restore_host_state_vhe(host_ctxt);
if (guest_owns_fp_regs())
--
2.30.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-02-06 14:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-02-06 14:10 [PATCH v2 0/8] KVM: arm64: FPSIMD/SVE/SME fixes Mark Rutland
2025-02-06 14:10 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] KVM: arm64: Unconditionally save+flush host FPSIMD/SVE/SME state Mark Rutland
2025-02-07 12:27 ` Will Deacon
2025-02-07 13:21 ` Mark Rutland
2025-02-10 10:53 ` Marc Zyngier
2025-02-10 15:05 ` Will Deacon
2025-02-06 14:10 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] KVM: arm64: Remove host FPSIMD saving for non-protected KVM Mark Rutland
2025-02-10 16:12 ` Will Deacon
2025-02-10 16:59 ` Mark Rutland
2025-02-10 18:06 ` Will Deacon
2025-02-10 20:03 ` Mark Rutland
2025-02-11 19:08 ` Mark Rutland
2025-02-06 14:10 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] KVM: arm64: Remove VHE host restore of CPACR_EL1.ZEN Mark Rutland
2025-02-10 16:14 ` Will Deacon
2025-02-06 14:10 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] KVM: arm64: Remove VHE host restore of CPACR_EL1.SMEN Mark Rutland
2025-02-10 16:16 ` Will Deacon
2025-02-06 14:10 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] KVM: arm64: Refactor CPTR trap deactivation Mark Rutland
2025-02-10 16:34 ` Will Deacon
2025-02-06 14:11 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] KVM: arm64: Refactor exit handlers Mark Rutland
2025-02-10 16:37 ` Will Deacon
2025-02-06 14:11 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] KVM: arm64: Mark some header functions as inline Mark Rutland
2025-02-10 16:39 ` Will Deacon
2025-02-06 14:11 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2025-02-06 19:12 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] KVM: arm64: Eagerly switch ZCR_EL{1,2} Mark Brown
2025-02-07 9:34 ` Mark Rutland
2025-02-10 16:53 ` Will Deacon
2025-02-10 17:21 ` Mark Rutland
2025-02-10 18:20 ` Will Deacon
2025-02-10 18:56 ` Mark Rutland
2025-02-11 10:29 ` Will Deacon
2025-02-08 0:27 ` [PATCH v2 0/8] KVM: arm64: FPSIMD/SVE/SME fixes Mark Brown
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