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From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	jannh@google.com, jmill@asu.edu, joao@overdrivepizza.com,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	luto@kernel.org, samitolvanen@google.com,
	scott.d.constable@intel.com, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Circumventing FineIBT Via Entrypoints
Date: Sun, 16 Feb 2025 15:51:27 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202502161547.B05817003F@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250215210729.GA25168@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net>

On Sat, Feb 15, 2025 at 10:07:29PM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 14, 2025 at 10:57:51AM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Thu, Feb 13, 2025 at 12:53:28PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> > 
> > > Right, the "if they can control a function pointer" is the part I'm
> > > focusing on. This attack depends on making an indirect call with a
> > > controlled pointer. Non-FineIBT CFI will protect against that step,
> > > so I think this is only an issue for IBT-only and FineIBT, but not CFI
> > > nor CFI+IBT.
> > 
> > Yes, the whole caller side validation should stop this.
> 
> And I think we can retro-fit that in FineIBT. Notably the current call
> sites look like:
> 
> 0000000000000060 <fineibt_caller>:
>   60:   41 ba 78 56 34 12       mov    $0x12345678,%r10d
>   66:   49 83 eb 10             sub    $0x10,%r11
>   6a:   0f 1f 40 00             nopl   0x0(%rax)
>   6e:   41 ff d3                call   *%r11
>   71:   0f 1f 00                nopl   (%rax)
> 
> Of which the last 6 bytes are the retpoline site (starting at 0x6e). It
> is trivially possible to re-arrange things to have both nops next to one
> another, giving us 7 bytes to muck about with.
> 
> And I think we can just about manage to do a caller side hash validation
> in them bytes like:
> 
> 0000000000000080 <fineibt_paranoid>:
>   80:   41 ba 78 56 34 12       mov    $0x12345678,%r10d
>   86:   49 83 eb 10             sub    $0x10,%r11
>   8a:   45 3b 53 07             cmp    0x7(%r11),%r10d
>   8e:   74 01                   je     91 <fineibt_paranoid+0x11>
>   90:   ea                      (bad)
>   91:   41 ff d3                call   *%r11

Ah nice! Yes, that would be great and removes all my concerns about
FineIBT. :) (And you went with EA just to distinguish it more easily?
Can't we still use the UD2 bug tables to find this like normal?)

> And while this is somewhat daft, it would close the hole vs this entry
> point swizzle afaict, no?
> 
> Patch against tip/x86/core (which includes the latest ibt bits as per
> this morning).
> 
> Boots and builds the next kernel on my ADL.

Lovely! Based on the patch, I assume you were testing CFI crash location
reporting too?

I'll try to get this spun up for testing here too.

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2025-02-16 23:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-02-12 21:08 [RFC] Circumventing FineIBT Via Entrypoints Jennifer Miller
2025-02-12 22:29 ` Jann Horn
2025-02-13  1:31   ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-13  2:09     ` Jann Horn
2025-02-13  2:42       ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-22 20:43         ` Rudolf Marek
2025-02-25 18:10           ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-25 20:06             ` Rudolf Marek
2025-02-25 21:14               ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-26  2:55                 ` Kees Cook
2025-02-26 22:48                 ` Rudolf Marek
2025-02-27  0:41                   ` Andrew Cooper
2025-03-01 22:48                     ` Rudolf Marek
2025-03-02 19:16                       ` Rudolf Marek
2025-03-02 22:31                         ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-28 12:13         ` Florian Weimer
2025-02-13 20:28     ` Kees Cook
2025-02-13 20:41       ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-13 20:53         ` Kees Cook
2025-02-13 20:57           ` Jann Horn
2025-02-16 23:42             ` Kees Cook
2025-02-14  9:57           ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-15 21:07             ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-16 23:51               ` Kees Cook [this message]
2025-02-17 10:39                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-17 13:06               ` David Laight
2025-02-17 13:13                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-17 18:38                   ` David Laight
2025-02-17 18:54                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-14 10:05         ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-14  9:54     ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-13  6:15   ` Jennifer Miller
2025-02-13 19:23     ` Jann Horn
2025-02-13 21:24       ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-13 23:24         ` Jennifer Miller
2025-02-13 23:43           ` Jann Horn
2025-02-14 23:06           ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-15  0:07             ` Jennifer Miller
2025-02-15  0:11               ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-15  0:19                 ` Jennifer Miller
2025-02-14 22:25       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-18 19:18 ` Joao Moreira

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