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From: David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	alyssa.milburn@intel.com, scott.d.constable@intel.com,
	joao@overdrivepizza.com, jpoimboe@kernel.org,
	jose.marchesi@oracle.com, hjl.tools@gmail.com,
	ndesaulniers@google.com, samitolvanen@google.com,
	nathan@kernel.org, ojeda@kernel.org, kees@kernel.org,
	alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com, mhiramat@kernel.org, jmill@asu.edu
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 07/10] x86/ibt: Add paranoid FineIBT mode
Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2025 13:40:36 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250221134036.641af213@pumpkin> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <dc7c570e-153e-4e46-ae40-d1590682d50c@citrix.com>

On Wed, 19 Feb 2025 17:31:39 +0000
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:

> On 19/02/2025 4:21 pm, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cfi.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cfi.h
> > @@ -1116,6 +1129,52 @@ extern u8 fineibt_caller_end[];
> >  
> >  #define fineibt_caller_jmp (fineibt_caller_size - 2)
> >  
> > +/*
> > + * Since FineIBT does hash validation on the callee side it is prone to
> > + * circumvention attacks where a 'naked' ENDBR instruction exists that
> > + * is not part of the fineibt_preamble sequence.
> > + *
> > + * Notably the x86 entry points must be ENDBR and equally cannot be
> > + * fineibt_preamble.
> > + *
> > + * The fineibt_paranoid caller sequence adds additional caller side
> > + * hash validation. This stops such circumvetion attacks dead, but at the cost
> > + * of adding a load.
> > + *
> > + * <fineibt_paranoid_start>:
> > + *  0:   41 ba 78 56 34 12       mov    $0x12345678, %r10d
> > + *  6:   45 3b 53 f7             cmp    -0x9(%r11), %r10d
> > + *  a:   4d 8d 5b <f0>           lea    -0x10(%r11), %r11

I think that 0x10 is the size of the cfi premable?
There should probably be at least a comment to that effect.
(Maybe there is, but I'm missing the actual patch email.)

> > + *  e:   75 fd                   jne    d <fineibt_paranoid_start+0xd>
> > + * 10:   41 ff d3                call   *%r11
> > + * 13:   90                      nop
> > + *
> > + * Notably LEA does not modify flags and can be reordered with the CMP,
> > + * avoiding a dependency.

Is that even worth saying?
Given that the cpu does 'register renaming' the lea might execute in the
same clock as the mov.

What you do get is a few clocks of stall (maybe 4 if in L1 cache, but
a data read of code memory is unlikely to be there - so it'll be from
the L2 cache) for the memory load.
That means that the jne is speculatively executed (and I think that is
separate from any prefetch speculation), I'll give it 50% taken.
(Or maybe 100% if backwards branches get predicted taken. I don't think
current Intel cpu do that - they just use whatever in in the branch
prediction slot.)

> > + * Again, using a non-taken (backwards) branch
> > + * for the failure case, abusing LEA's immediate 0xf0 as LOCK prefix for the
> > + * JCC.d8, causing #UD.
> > + */  
> 
> I don't know what to say.  This is equal parts horrifying and beautiful.

Agreed.

Are you absolutely sure that all cpu have (and will) always #UD the unexpected
LOCK prefix on a Jcc instruction.
My 80386 book does say it will #UD, but I can imagine it being ignored
or even repurposed.

	David



  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-02-21 13:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-02-19 16:21 [PATCH v3 00/10] x86/ibt: FineIBT-BHI Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-19 16:21 ` [PATCH v3 01/10] x86/cfi: Add warn option Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-19 17:50   ` Kees Cook
2025-02-19 17:56     ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-19 16:21 ` [PATCH v3 02/10] x86/ibt: Add exact_endbr() helper Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-19 17:51   ` Kees Cook
2025-02-19 16:21 ` [PATCH v3 03/10] x86/traps: Decode 0xEA #UD Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-19 16:47   ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-19 16:49     ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-19 17:52   ` Kees Cook
2025-02-19 16:21 ` [PATCH v3 04/10] x86/traps: Allow custom fixups in handle_bug() Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-19 17:55   ` Kees Cook
2025-02-19 18:17     ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-19 16:21 ` [PATCH v3 05/10] x86/ibt: Optimize FineIBT sequence Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-19 17:15   ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-20 18:28     ` Constable, Scott D
2025-02-19 18:01   ` Kees Cook
2025-02-19 18:18     ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-19 18:23       ` Kees Cook
2025-02-19 16:21 ` [PATCH v3 06/10] x86/traps: Decode LOCK Jcc.d8 #UD Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-19 16:45   ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-19 18:20   ` Kees Cook
2025-02-19 18:33     ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-19 19:44       ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-19 16:21 ` [PATCH v3 07/10] x86/ibt: Add paranoid FineIBT mode Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-19 17:31   ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-19 20:07     ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-21 13:40     ` David Laight [this message]
2025-02-19 18:05   ` Kees Cook
2025-02-19 16:21 ` [PATCH v3 08/10] x86: BHI stubs Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-19 18:07   ` Kees Cook
2025-02-19 18:07     ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-19 16:21 ` [PATCH v3 09/10] x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT-BHI mitigation Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-19 18:11   ` Kees Cook
2025-02-19 16:21 ` [PATCH v3 10/10] x86/ibt: Optimize fineibt-bhi arity 1 case Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-19 18:21   ` Kees Cook
2025-02-19 17:36 ` [PATCH v3 00/10] x86/ibt: FineIBT-BHI Kees Cook
2025-02-20 11:27 ` Peter Zijlstra

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