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From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Patrick Bellasi <derkling@google.com>, Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6.6] x86/cpu/kvm: SRSO: Fix possible missing IBPB on VM-Exit
Date: Sat, 22 Feb 2025 10:53:47 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250221203055-b786f70fab651df1@stable.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250221142002.4136456-1-derkling@google.com>

[ Sasha's backport helper bot ]

Hi,

✅ All tests passed successfully. No issues detected.
No action required from the submitter.

The upstream commit SHA1 provided is correct: 318e8c339c9a0891c389298bb328ed0762a9935e

Note: The patch differs from the upstream commit:
---
1:  318e8c339c9a0 ! 1:  7e78323cfe696 x86/cpu/kvm: SRSO: Fix possible missing IBPB on VM-Exit
    @@ Metadata
      ## Commit message ##
         x86/cpu/kvm: SRSO: Fix possible missing IBPB on VM-Exit
     
    +    commit 318e8c339c9a0891c389298bb328ed0762a9935e upstream.
    +
         In [1] the meaning of the synthetic IBPB flags has been redefined for a
         better separation of concerns:
          - ENTRY_IBPB     -- issue IBPB on entry only
    @@ Commit message
         Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
     
      ## arch/x86/Kconfig ##
    -@@ arch/x86/Kconfig: config MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
    +@@ arch/x86/Kconfig: config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY
      	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64
      	default y
      	help
    @@ arch/x86/Kconfig: config MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
     +	  Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb and
     +	  spec_rstack_overflow={ibpb,ibpb-vmexit} mitigations.
      
    - config MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
    + config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
      	bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry"
     
      ## arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c ##
    @@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
      		 * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
      		 * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
     @@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
    - 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
    + 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
      			if (has_microcode) {
      				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
     +				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
    @@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
     +				setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
      			}
      		} else {
    - 			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
    + 			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
     @@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
    + 		break;
      
    - ibpb_on_vmexit:
      	case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
    --		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) {
    +-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) {
     -			if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) {
    -+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
    ++		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
     +			if (has_microcode) {
      				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
      				srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
    @@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
      				setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
      			}
      		} else {
    --			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_SRSO.\n");
    +-			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n");
    ++			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
    + 			goto pred_cmd;
     -                }
    -+			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
     +		}
      		break;
    + 
      	default:
    - 		break;
---

Results of testing on various branches:

| Branch                    | Patch Apply | Build Test |
|---------------------------|-------------|------------|
| stable/linux-6.6.y        |  Success    |  Success   |

      parent reply	other threads:[~2025-02-22 15:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-02-21 14:20 [PATCH 6.6] x86/cpu/kvm: SRSO: Fix possible missing IBPB on VM-Exit Patrick Bellasi
2025-02-22 14:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-22 15:53 ` Sasha Levin [this message]

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