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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: CVE-2022-49504: scsi: lpfc: Inhibit aborts if external loopback plug is inserted
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2025 03:12:58 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2025022608-CVE-2022-49504-9b25@gregkh> (raw)

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: lpfc: Inhibit aborts if external loopback plug is inserted

After running a short external loopback test, when the external loopback is
removed and a normal cable inserted that is directly connected to a target
device, the system oops in the llpfc_set_rrq_active() routine.

When the loopback was inserted an FLOGI was transmit. As we're looped back,
we receive the FLOGI request. The FLOGI is ABTS'd as we recognize the same
wppn thus understand it's a loopback. However, as the ABTS sends address
information the port is not set to (fffffe), the ABTS is dropped on the
wire. A short 1 frame loopback test is run and completes before the ABTS
times out. The looback is unplugged and the new cable plugged in, and the
an FLOGI to the new device occurs and completes. Due to a mixup in ref
counting the completion of the new FLOGI releases the fabric ndlp. Then the
original ABTS completes and references the released ndlp generating the
oops.

Correct by no-op'ing the ABTS when in loopback mode (it will be dropped
anyway). Added a flag to track the mode to recognize when it should be
no-op'd.

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2022-49504 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Fixed in 5.18.3 with commit a1516930cb605caee3bc7b4f3b7994b88c0b8505
	Fixed in 5.19 with commit ead76d4c09b89f4c8d632648026a476a5a34fde8

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2022-49504
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc.h
	drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_els.c
	drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hbadisc.c
	drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_sli.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a1516930cb605caee3bc7b4f3b7994b88c0b8505
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ead76d4c09b89f4c8d632648026a476a5a34fde8

                 reply	other threads:[~2025-02-26  2:15 UTC|newest]

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