From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>,
cve@kernel.org, gnoack@google.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
kent.overstreet@linux.dev, linux-bcachefs@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, mic@digikod.net,
Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Unprivileged filesystem mounts
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2025 10:54:07 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250311175407.GC1268@sol.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Z8_Q4nOR5X3iZq3j@dread.disaster.area>
On Tue, Mar 11, 2025 at 04:57:54PM +1100, Dave Chinner wrote:
> And is this a real attack vector that Android must defend against,
> why isn't that device and filesystem image cryptographically signed
> and verified at boot time to prevent such attacks? That will prevent
> the entire class of malicious tampering exploits completely without
> having to care about undiscovered filesystem bugs - that's a much
> more robust solution from a verified boot and system security
> perspective...
That's exactly how it works. See
https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/verifiedboot and
https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/verifiedboot/dm-verity.
- Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-03-11 17:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-06 16:08 CVE-2025-21830: landlock: Handle weird files Greg Kroah-Hartman
2025-03-10 12:00 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-10 13:49 ` Kent Overstreet
2025-03-10 14:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2025-03-10 23:42 ` Dave Chinner
2025-03-11 2:09 ` Kent Overstreet
2025-03-11 4:24 ` Dave Chinner
2025-03-11 10:50 ` Kent Overstreet
2025-03-11 2:19 ` Unprivileged filesystem mounts Demi Marie Obenour
2025-03-11 5:57 ` Dave Chinner
2025-03-11 11:01 ` Christian Brauner
2025-03-11 17:36 ` Al Viro
2025-03-11 17:43 ` Kent Overstreet
2025-03-11 17:54 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2025-03-11 20:10 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2025-03-18 5:21 ` Dave Chinner
2025-03-19 14:55 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2025-03-19 16:59 ` Theodore Ts'o
2025-03-19 17:32 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2025-03-19 20:11 ` Theodore Ts'o
2025-03-18 22:11 ` Theodore Ts'o
2025-03-19 17:44 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2025-03-19 21:25 ` Theodore Ts'o
2025-03-20 6:26 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2025-03-20 16:00 ` Theodore Ts'o
2025-03-11 6:53 ` CVE-2025-21830: landlock: Handle weird files Greg Kroah-Hartman
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20250311175407.GC1268@sol.localdomain \
--to=ebiggers@kernel.org \
--cc=cve@kernel.org \
--cc=david@fromorbit.com \
--cc=demi@invisiblethingslab.com \
--cc=demiobenour@gmail.com \
--cc=gnoack@google.com \
--cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=kent.overstreet@linux.dev \
--cc=linux-bcachefs@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mic@digikod.net \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.