From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org, aik@amd.com
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6.13.y] virt: sev-guest: Move SNP Guest Request data pages handling under snp_cmd_mutex
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2025 05:01:44 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250312224217-281d7f5ef03b0f1c@stable.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250310100027.1228858-1-aik@amd.com>
[ Sasha's backport helper bot ]
Hi,
Summary of potential issues:
⚠️ Found matching upstream commit but patch is missing proper reference to it
Found matching upstream commit: 3e385c0d6ce88ac9916dcf84267bd5855d830748
Note: The patch differs from the upstream commit:
---
1: 3e385c0d6ce88 ! 1: a6b033d98441d virt: sev-guest: Move SNP Guest Request data pages handling under snp_cmd_mutex
@@ Metadata
## Commit message ##
virt: sev-guest: Move SNP Guest Request data pages handling under snp_cmd_mutex
- Compared to the SNP Guest Request, the "Extended" version adds data pages for
- receiving certificates. If not enough pages provided, the HV can report to the
- VM how much is needed so the VM can reallocate and repeat.
+ Compared to the SNP Guest Request, the "Extended" version adds data pages
+ for receiving certificates. If not enough pages provided, the HV can
+ report to the VM how much is needed so the VM can reallocate and repeat.
- Commit
-
- ae596615d93d ("virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command mutex")
-
- moved handling of the allocated/desired pages number out of scope of said
- mutex and create a possibility for a race (multiple instances trying to
- trigger Extended request in a VM) as there is just one instance of
- snp_msg_desc per /dev/sev-guest and no locking other than snp_cmd_mutex.
+ Commit ae596615d93d ("virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command
+ mutex") moved handling of the allocated/desired pages number out of scope
+ of said mutex and create a possibility for a race (multiple instances
+ trying to trigger Extended request in a VM) as there is just one instance
+ of snp_msg_desc per /dev/sev-guest and no locking other than snp_cmd_mutex.
Fix the issue by moving the data blob/size and the GHCB input struct
- (snp_req_data) into snp_guest_req which is allocated on stack now and accessed
- by the GHCB caller under that mutex.
+ (snp_req_data) into snp_guest_req which is allocated on stack now
+ and accessed by the GHCB caller under that mutex.
- Stop allocating SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE in snp_msg_alloc() as only one of four
- callers needs it. Free the received blob in get_ext_report() right after it is
- copied to the userspace. Possible future users of snp_send_guest_request() are
- likely to have different ideas about the buffer size anyways.
+ Stop allocating SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE in snp_msg_alloc() as only one of
+ four callers needs it. Free the received blob in get_ext_report() right
+ after it is copied to the userspace. Possible future users of
+ snp_send_guest_request() are likely to have different ideas about
+ the buffer size anyways.
Fixes: ae596615d93d ("virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command mutex")
+ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.13
+ Cc: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
- Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
- Reviewed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
- Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
- Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250307013700.437505-3-aik@amd.com
- ## arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c ##
-@@ arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c: struct snp_msg_desc *snp_msg_alloc(void)
- if (!mdesc->response)
- goto e_free_request;
+ ## arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h ##
+@@ arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h: struct snp_guest_req {
+ unsigned int vmpck_id;
+ u8 msg_version;
+ u8 msg_type;
++
++ struct snp_req_data input;
++ void *certs_data;
+ };
-- mdesc->certs_data = alloc_shared_pages(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE);
-- if (!mdesc->certs_data)
-- goto e_free_response;
--
-- /* initial the input address for guest request */
-- mdesc->input.req_gpa = __pa(mdesc->request);
-- mdesc->input.resp_gpa = __pa(mdesc->response);
-- mdesc->input.data_gpa = __pa(mdesc->certs_data);
+ /*
+@@ arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h: struct snp_msg_desc {
+ struct snp_guest_msg secret_request, secret_response;
+
+ struct snp_secrets_page *secrets;
+- struct snp_req_data input;
-
- return mdesc;
+- void *certs_data;
--e_free_response:
-- free_shared_pages(mdesc->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
- e_free_request:
- free_shared_pages(mdesc->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
- e_unmap:
-@@ arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c: void snp_msg_free(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc)
- kfree(mdesc->ctx);
- free_shared_pages(mdesc->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
- free_shared_pages(mdesc->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
-- free_shared_pages(mdesc->certs_data, SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE);
- iounmap((__force void __iomem *)mdesc->secrets);
+ struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx;
- memset(mdesc, 0, sizeof(*mdesc));
-@@ arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c: static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_r
+
+ ## drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c ##
+@@ drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c: static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_r
* sequence number must be incremented or the VMPCK must be deleted to
* prevent reuse of the IV.
*/
@@ arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c: static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc
switch (rc) {
case -ENOSPC:
/*
-@@ arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c: static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_r
+@@ drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c: static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_r
* order to increment the sequence number and thus avoid
* IV reuse.
*/
@@ arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c: static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc
req->exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST;
/*
-@@ arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c: static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_r
+@@ drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c: static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_r
}
if (override_npages)
@@ arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c: static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc
return rc;
}
-@@ arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c: int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *req
- */
- memcpy(mdesc->request, &mdesc->secret_request, sizeof(mdesc->secret_request));
+@@ drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c: static int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_r
+ memcpy(mdesc->request, &mdesc->secret_request,
+ sizeof(mdesc->secret_request));
-+ /* Initialize the input address for guest request */
++ /* initial the input address for guest request */
+ req->input.req_gpa = __pa(mdesc->request);
+ req->input.resp_gpa = __pa(mdesc->response);
+ req->input.data_gpa = req->certs_data ? __pa(req->certs_data) : 0;
@@ arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c: int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc,
rc = __handle_guest_request(mdesc, req, rio);
if (rc) {
if (rc == -EIO &&
-
- ## arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h ##
-@@ arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h: struct snp_guest_req {
- unsigned int vmpck_id;
- u8 msg_version;
- u8 msg_type;
-+
-+ struct snp_req_data input;
-+ void *certs_data;
- };
-
- /*
-@@ arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h: struct snp_msg_desc {
- struct snp_guest_msg secret_request, secret_response;
-
- struct snp_secrets_page *secrets;
-- struct snp_req_data input;
--
-- void *certs_data;
-
- struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx;
-
-
- ## drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c ##
@@ drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c: static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reques
struct snp_guest_req req = {};
int ret, npages = 0, resp_len;
@@ drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c: static int get_ext_report(struct snp_gu
return ret;
}
+@@ drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c: static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
+ if (!mdesc->response)
+ goto e_free_request;
+
+- mdesc->certs_data = alloc_shared_pages(dev, SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE);
+- if (!mdesc->certs_data)
+- goto e_free_response;
+-
+ ret = -EIO;
+ mdesc->ctx = snp_init_crypto(mdesc->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
+ if (!mdesc->ctx)
+- goto e_free_cert_data;
++ goto e_free_response;
+
+ misc = &snp_dev->misc;
+ misc->minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR;
+ misc->name = DEVICE_NAME;
+ misc->fops = &snp_guest_fops;
+
+- /* Initialize the input addresses for guest request */
+- mdesc->input.req_gpa = __pa(mdesc->request);
+- mdesc->input.resp_gpa = __pa(mdesc->response);
+- mdesc->input.data_gpa = __pa(mdesc->certs_data);
+-
+ /* Set the privlevel_floor attribute based on the vmpck_id */
+ sev_tsm_ops.privlevel_floor = vmpck_id;
+
+ ret = tsm_register(&sev_tsm_ops, snp_dev);
+ if (ret)
+- goto e_free_cert_data;
++ goto e_free_response;
+
+ ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(&pdev->dev, unregister_sev_tsm, NULL);
+ if (ret)
+- goto e_free_cert_data;
++ goto e_free_response;
+
+ ret = misc_register(misc);
+ if (ret)
+@@ drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c: static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
+
+ e_free_ctx:
+ kfree(mdesc->ctx);
+-e_free_cert_data:
+- free_shared_pages(mdesc->certs_data, SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE);
+ e_free_response:
+ free_shared_pages(mdesc->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
+ e_free_request:
+@@ drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c: static void __exit sev_guest_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
+ struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
+ struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc = snp_dev->msg_desc;
+
+- free_shared_pages(mdesc->certs_data, SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE);
+ free_shared_pages(mdesc->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
+ free_shared_pages(mdesc->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
+ kfree(mdesc->ctx);
---
Results of testing on various branches:
| Branch | Patch Apply | Build Test |
|---------------------------|-------------|------------|
| stable/linux-6.13.y | Success | Success |
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-03-13 9:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-09 10:29 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] virt: sev-guest: Move SNP Guest Request data pages handling" failed to apply to 6.13-stable tree gregkh
2025-03-10 10:00 ` [PATCH 6.13.y] virt: sev-guest: Move SNP Guest Request data pages handling under snp_cmd_mutex Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-03-10 10:13 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-03-10 10:35 ` Greg KH
2025-03-13 9:01 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2025-03-10 15:35 ` FAILED: patch "[PATCH] virt: sev-guest: Move SNP Guest Request data pages handling" failed to apply to 6.13-stable tree Borislav Petkov
2025-03-11 7:36 ` [PATCH 6.13.y] virt: sev-guest: Move SNP Guest Request data pages handling under snp_cmd_mutex Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-03-13 9:08 ` Sasha Levin
2025-03-13 11:09 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-03-13 11:34 ` Greg KH
2025-03-13 12:32 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
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