From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mrpre@163.com, Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me>, Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>,
Mykola Lysenko <mykolal@fb.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>,
Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@gmail.com>,
Anton Protopopov <aspsk@isovalent.com>,
Abhishek Chauhan <quic_abchauha@quicinc.com>,
Jordan Rome <linux@jordanrome.com>,
Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com>,
David Lechner <dlechner@baylibre.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH bpf v2 0/2] bpf, xdp: clean adjust_{head,meta} memory when offset < 0
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2025 11:23:43 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250331032354.75808-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev> (raw)
This patchset originates from my attempt to resolve a KMSAN warning that
has existed for over 3 years:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0e6ddb1ef80986bdfe64
Previously, we had a brief discussion in this thread about whether we can
simply perform memset in adjust_{head,meta}:
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250328043941.085de23b@kernel.org/T/#t
Unfortunately, I couldn't find a similar topic in the mail list, but I did
find a similar security-related commit:
commit 6dfb970d3dbd ("xdp: avoid leaking info stored in frame data on page reuse")
I just create a new topic here and make subject more clear, we can discuss
this here.
Meanwhile, I also discovered a related issue that led to a CVE,specifically
the Facebook Katran vulnerability (https://vuldb.com/?id.246309).
Currently, even with unprivileged functionality disabled, a user can load
a BPF program using CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN, which I believe we should
avoid exposing kernel memory directly to users now.
Regarding performance considerations, I added corresponding results to the
selftest, testing common MAC headers and IP headers of various sizes.
Compared to not using memset, the execution time increased by 2ns, but I
think this is negligible considering the entire net stack.
Jiayuan Chen (2):
bpf, xdp: clean head/meta when expanding it
selftests/bpf: add perf test for adjust_{head,meta}
include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 8 +--
net/core/filter.c | 5 +-
tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 6 ++-
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_perf.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++---
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/xdp_dummy.c | 14 +++++
5 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--
2.47.1
next reply other threads:[~2025-03-31 3:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-31 3:23 Jiayuan Chen [this message]
2025-03-31 3:23 ` [PATCH bpf v2 1/2] bpf, xdp: clean head/meta when expanding it Jiayuan Chen
2025-04-03 8:17 ` Jesper Dangaard Brouer
2025-04-03 14:24 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-04-03 14:32 ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-04-04 0:28 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-04-04 0:27 ` Jiayuan Chen
2025-04-04 0:29 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-03-31 3:23 ` [PATCH bpf v2 2/2] selftests/bpf: add perf test for adjust_{head,meta} Jiayuan Chen
2025-04-03 0:24 ` Jakub Kicinski
2025-04-03 9:37 ` Jesper Dangaard Brouer
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