From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1F4D122069E; Mon, 31 Mar 2025 14:34:49 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1743431689; cv=none; b=E0MqgCjM/uggOYtIPcln8oXK7tDm6GljW1BUhUOXorFqH0+bSEgSCOrrwHp/rYNXGZ+Y+NW3pPFU4Af6p2+vwIzCGmb2IXmR0jbxVKbkhSwGz8PWVeGAAmmcHehR9RmBU54guJKxW8g0Gq86PcgIhLCISuit0yTOsW0qfInea3s= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1743431689; c=relaxed/simple; bh=5DlYIc+Mxp6wP2XagxFIavXx5bYn9hjr7ENOqeYEYRg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=hCJIRKjke09avaS91c3oXVjiE+vsmqHznoXsSaqZRRWW7AfHPewNBi8z4TWoX42B5l58dkmmuLbfAMocN/6ZaErDJRDMxPFDlwki4Je/drCWIwL3VRQYmDixD3exMHyPFT4RXFQPUArRN6rl4MxWzUbp0dfclmzgx1x/HN0at2k= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=IWkyQDIy; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="IWkyQDIy" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 68892C4CEE4; Mon, 31 Mar 2025 14:34:47 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1743431689; bh=5DlYIc+Mxp6wP2XagxFIavXx5bYn9hjr7ENOqeYEYRg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=IWkyQDIy50TLV/WySs1Lw9uVGy7Qg5xaEDB96ruhiRYxO5MISUro3sNGEdSUuO2My VhSUL13soC1PNNE2KGCqxcE4qjTswoz8qjeOd1xTwdA7bQdU8VNVBBoWS5SxBYlwlL VBnXtL4XLBfkngukOl0FRqFwsSMCeulcp6FULr8sQ/3tAOd7F1anOwrb6/eJ3QOpXY GUjz2KgSr3ZPTkQeRzFksGdsQ7bonWIswX9dEltci1ZtBlsrriXwlxF6AyrWiRGUzA yE28Ohpuc5ZBSbEwwflPP3UtgL9G6JyDj2TwdyRmB5epISOv25SxwV8w6KkTRbZ+ru lqJp2nloLWcwg== From: Sasha Levin To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Ingo Molnar , Kai Huang , Tom Lendacky , Andy Lutomirski , Linus Torvalds , Sasha Levin , dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, peterz@infradead.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, x86@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.14 16/18] x86/mm/ident_map: Fix theoretical virtual address overflow to zero Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2025 10:34:06 -0400 Message-Id: <20250331143409.1682789-16-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.5 In-Reply-To: <20250331143409.1682789-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <20250331143409.1682789-1-sashal@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: Ignore X-stable-base: Linux 6.14 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" [ Upstream commit f666c92090a41ac5524dade63ff96b3adcf8c2ab ] The current calculation of the 'next' virtual address in the page table initialization functions in arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c doesn't protect against wrapping to zero. This is a theoretical issue that cannot happen currently, the problematic case is possible only if the user sets a high enough x86_mapping_info::offset value - which no current code in the upstream kernel does. ( The wrapping to zero only occurs if the top PGD entry is accessed. There are no such users upstream. Only hibernate_64.c uses x86_mapping_info::offset, and it operates on the direct mapping range, which is not the top PGD entry. ) Should such an overflow happen, it can result in page table corruption and a hang. To future-proof this code, replace the manual 'next' calculation with p?d_addr_end() which handles wrapping correctly. [ Backporter's note: there's no need to backport this patch. ] Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Reviewed-by: Kai Huang Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241016111458.846228-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c | 14 +++----------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c index 5ab7bd2f1983c..bd5d101c5c379 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c @@ -101,9 +101,7 @@ static int ident_pud_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pud_t *pud_page, pmd_t *pmd; bool use_gbpage; - next = (addr & PUD_MASK) + PUD_SIZE; - if (next > end) - next = end; + next = pud_addr_end(addr, end); /* if this is already a gbpage, this portion is already mapped */ if (pud_leaf(*pud)) @@ -154,10 +152,7 @@ static int ident_p4d_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, p4d_t *p4d_page, p4d_t *p4d = p4d_page + p4d_index(addr); pud_t *pud; - next = (addr & P4D_MASK) + P4D_SIZE; - if (next > end) - next = end; - + next = p4d_addr_end(addr, end); if (p4d_present(*p4d)) { pud = pud_offset(p4d, 0); result = ident_pud_init(info, pud, addr, next); @@ -199,10 +194,7 @@ int kernel_ident_mapping_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd_page, pgd_t *pgd = pgd_page + pgd_index(addr); p4d_t *p4d; - next = (addr & PGDIR_MASK) + PGDIR_SIZE; - if (next > end) - next = end; - + next = pgd_addr_end(addr, end); if (pgd_present(*pgd)) { p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, 0); result = ident_p4d_init(info, p4d, addr, next); -- 2.39.5