From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+git@google.com>
To: mingo@kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/boot: Move early SME init code into startup/
Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2025 08:11:35 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250407061132.69315-6-ardb+git@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250407061132.69315-4-ardb+git@google.com>
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Move the SME initialization code, which runs from the 1:1 mapping of
memory as it operates on the kernel virtual mapping, into the new
sub-directory arch/x86/boot/startup/ where all startup code will reside
that needs to tolerate executing from the 1:1 mapping.
This allows RIP_REL_REF() macro invocations and __head annotations to be
dropped.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/boot/startup/Makefile | 1 +
arch/x86/{mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c => boot/startup/sme.c} | 45 +++++++++-----------
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 6 ---
4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/startup/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/startup/Makefile
index 01423063fec2..480c2d2063a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/startup/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/startup/Makefile
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ UBSAN_SANITIZE := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_64) += gdt_idt.o map_kernel.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += sme.o
lib-$(CONFIG_X86_64) += la57toggle.o
lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED) += efi-mixed.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sme.c
similarity index 92%
rename from arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
rename to arch/x86/boot/startup/sme.c
index 5eecdd92da10..85bd39652535 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sme.c
@@ -45,8 +45,6 @@
#include <asm/coco.h>
#include <asm/sev.h>
-#include "mm_internal.h"
-
#define PGD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
#define P4D_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
#define PUD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
@@ -93,7 +91,7 @@ struct sme_populate_pgd_data {
*/
static char sme_workarea[2 * PMD_SIZE] __section(".init.scratch");
-static void __head sme_clear_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __init sme_clear_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
unsigned long pgd_start, pgd_end, pgd_size;
pgd_t *pgd_p;
@@ -108,7 +106,7 @@ static void __head sme_clear_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
memset(pgd_p, 0, pgd_size);
}
-static pud_t __head *sme_prepare_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static pud_t __init *sme_prepare_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
p4d_t *p4d;
@@ -145,7 +143,7 @@ static pud_t __head *sme_prepare_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
return pud;
}
-static void __head sme_populate_pgd_large(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __init sme_populate_pgd_large(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
@@ -161,7 +159,7 @@ static void __head sme_populate_pgd_large(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(ppd->paddr | ppd->pmd_flags));
}
-static void __head sme_populate_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __init sme_populate_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
@@ -187,7 +185,7 @@ static void __head sme_populate_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
set_pte(pte, __pte(ppd->paddr | ppd->pte_flags));
}
-static void __head __sme_map_range_pmd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __init __sme_map_range_pmd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
while (ppd->vaddr < ppd->vaddr_end) {
sme_populate_pgd_large(ppd);
@@ -197,7 +195,7 @@ static void __head __sme_map_range_pmd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
}
}
-static void __head __sme_map_range_pte(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __init __sme_map_range_pte(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
while (ppd->vaddr < ppd->vaddr_end) {
sme_populate_pgd(ppd);
@@ -207,7 +205,7 @@ static void __head __sme_map_range_pte(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
}
}
-static void __head __sme_map_range(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd,
+static void __init __sme_map_range(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd,
pmdval_t pmd_flags, pteval_t pte_flags)
{
unsigned long vaddr_end;
@@ -231,22 +229,22 @@ static void __head __sme_map_range(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd,
__sme_map_range_pte(ppd);
}
-static void __head sme_map_range_encrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __init sme_map_range_encrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
__sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_ENC, PTE_FLAGS_ENC);
}
-static void __head sme_map_range_decrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __init sme_map_range_decrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
__sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_DEC, PTE_FLAGS_DEC);
}
-static void __head sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __init sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
__sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WP, PTE_FLAGS_DEC_WP);
}
-static unsigned long __head sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len)
+static unsigned long __init sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len)
{
unsigned long entries = 0, tables = 0;
@@ -283,7 +281,7 @@ static unsigned long __head sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len)
return entries + tables;
}
-void __head sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
+void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
{
unsigned long workarea_start, workarea_end, workarea_len;
unsigned long execute_start, execute_end, execute_len;
@@ -299,8 +297,7 @@ void __head sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
* instrumentation or checking boot_cpu_data in the cc_platform_has()
* function.
*/
- if (!sme_get_me_mask() ||
- RIP_REL_REF(sev_status) & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED)
+ if (!sme_get_me_mask() || sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED)
return;
/*
@@ -318,8 +315,8 @@ void __head sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
* memory from being cached.
*/
- kernel_start = (unsigned long)RIP_REL_REF(_text);
- kernel_end = ALIGN((unsigned long)RIP_REL_REF(_end), PMD_SIZE);
+ kernel_start = (unsigned long)_text;
+ kernel_end = ALIGN((unsigned long)_end, PMD_SIZE);
kernel_len = kernel_end - kernel_start;
initrd_start = 0;
@@ -345,7 +342,7 @@ void __head sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
* pagetable structures for the encryption of the kernel
* pagetable structures for workarea (in case not currently mapped)
*/
- execute_start = workarea_start = (unsigned long)RIP_REL_REF(sme_workarea);
+ execute_start = workarea_start = (unsigned long)sme_workarea;
execute_end = execute_start + (PAGE_SIZE * 2) + PMD_SIZE;
execute_len = execute_end - execute_start;
@@ -488,7 +485,7 @@ void __head sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
}
-void __head sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
+void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
{
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
unsigned long feature_mask;
@@ -526,7 +523,7 @@ void __head sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
/* Check the SEV MSR whether SEV or SME is enabled */
- RIP_REL_REF(sev_status) = msr = __rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV);
+ sev_status = msr = __rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV);
feature_mask = (msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED) ? AMD_SEV_BIT : AMD_SME_BIT;
/*
@@ -562,8 +559,8 @@ void __head sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
return;
}
- RIP_REL_REF(sme_me_mask) = me_mask;
- RIP_REL_REF(physical_mask) &= ~me_mask;
- RIP_REL_REF(cc_vendor) = CC_VENDOR_AMD;
+ sme_me_mask = me_mask;
+ physical_mask &= ~me_mask;
+ cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_AMD;
cc_set_mask(me_mask);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 1530ee301dfe..ea6494628cb0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
static inline u64 sme_get_me_mask(void)
{
- return RIP_REL_REF(sme_me_mask);
+ return sme_me_mask;
}
#define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted")
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
index 32035d5be5a0..3faa60f13a61 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
@@ -3,12 +3,10 @@
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_tlb.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt_amd.o := n
-KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt_identity.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_pgprot.o := n
KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt.o := n
KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt_amd.o := n
-KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt_identity.o := n
KASAN_SANITIZE_pgprot.o := n
# Disable KCSAN entirely, because otherwise we get warnings that some functions
@@ -16,12 +14,10 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE_pgprot.o := n
KCSAN_SANITIZE := n
# Avoid recursion by not calling KMSAN hooks for CEA code.
KMSAN_SANITIZE_cpu_entry_area.o := n
-KMSAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt_identity.o := n
ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
CFLAGS_REMOVE_mem_encrypt.o = -pg
CFLAGS_REMOVE_mem_encrypt_amd.o = -pg
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_mem_encrypt_identity.o = -pg
CFLAGS_REMOVE_pgprot.o = -pg
endif
@@ -32,7 +28,6 @@ obj-y += pat/
# Make sure __phys_addr has no stackprotector
CFLAGS_physaddr.o := -fno-stack-protector
-CFLAGS_mem_encrypt_identity.o := -fno-stack-protector
CFLAGS_fault.o := -I $(src)/../include/asm/trace
@@ -63,5 +58,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) += pti.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_amd.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_identity.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_boot.o
--
2.49.0.504.g3bcea36a83-goog
prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-07 6:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-07 6:11 [PATCH v2 0/2] x86: Refactor and consolidate startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2025-04-07 6:11 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/boot: Move early kernel mapping code into startup/ Ard Biesheuvel
2025-04-07 17:44 ` Ingo Molnar
2025-04-07 17:55 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-04-07 18:06 ` Ingo Molnar
2025-04-07 6:11 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
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