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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>,
	Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
	cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org,
	Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>,
	Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: CVE-2024-49995: tipc: guard against string buffer overrun
Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2025 15:44:43 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2025042434-stoic-growl-a7ec@gregkh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8781b7c9-65e4-47c1-8f1a-5cbc7a975128@oracle.com>

On Thu, Apr 24, 2025 at 02:15:43PM +0530, Harshit Mogalapalli wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> 
> On 24/04/25 13:47, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> > On Thu, Apr 24, 2025 at 11:41:01AM +0530, Harshit Mogalapalli wrote:
> ...
> > > 
> > > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=6555a2a9212be6983d2319d65276484f7c5f431a&context=30
> > > 
> > > 
> > >   	/* validate component parts of bearer name */
> > >   	if ((media_len <= 1) || (media_len > TIPC_MAX_MEDIA_NAME) ||
> > >   	    (if_len <= 1) || (if_len > TIPC_MAX_IF_NAME))
> > >   		return 0;
> > > 
> > >   	/* return bearer name components, if necessary */
> > >   	if (name_parts) {
> > > -		strcpy(name_parts->media_name, media_name);
> > > -		strcpy(name_parts->if_name, if_name);
> > > +		if (strscpy(name_parts->media_name, media_name,
> > > +			    TIPC_MAX_MEDIA_NAME) < 0)
> > > +			return 0;
> > > +		if (strscpy(name_parts->if_name, if_name,
> > > +			    TIPC_MAX_IF_NAME) < 0)
> > > +			return 0;
> > >   	}
> > >   	return 1;
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > both media_len and if_len have validation checks above the if(name_parts)
> > > check. So I think this patch just silences the static checker warnings.
> > > 
> > > Simon/Dan , could you please help confirming that ?
> > 
> > Correct.  The "validate component parts of bearer name" checks are
> > sufficient.  This will not affect runtime.
> > 
> 
> Thanks a lot Dan and Simon for confirming this.
> 
> Greg: Should we get this CVE-2024-49995 revoked ?

Yup, now rejected, thanks for the review!

greg k-h

      reply	other threads:[~2025-04-24 13:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-21 18:03 CVE-2024-49995: tipc: guard against string buffer overrun Greg Kroah-Hartman
2025-04-24  6:11 ` Harshit Mogalapalli
2025-04-24  7:30   ` Simon Horman
2025-04-24  8:17   ` Dan Carpenter
2025-04-24  8:45     ` Harshit Mogalapalli
2025-04-24 13:44       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]

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